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Preface
In the present doctoral thesis I apply the experimental method in the con-
text of two lines of research in Economics, the former investigating the role of
incidental emotions in decision making under risk, whereas the latter shed-
ding light on the impact of communication on cooperation. The dissertation
consists of three sections.
In the first chapter I conduct a laboratory experiment in order to study
the effect of incidental sadness and happiness on risky decision making. An
emotion induction procedure is the treatment variable of a between-subjects
design where two sessions aim at eliciting either sadness or happiness, re-
spectively. Two further groups are characterized by neutral conditions and
serve as baseline. After a manipulation check verifies the validity of the in-
duction procedure, I use a multiple price list a` la Holt and Laury (2002) to
elicit individual risk preferences in the context of a lottery-choice task. The
analysis reveals that both sadness and happiness promote greater risk aver-
sion with respect to neutral conditions, a result which might be moderated
by the risk elicitation task. Therefore, as effective explanation I propose the
theory of ego depletion, whereby regulating emotions so as to subsequently
process information consumes a limited self-control resource, which is needed
to take risks as well.
The second chapter is a meta-analysis of experimental studies on the
same topic, so as to explain traditional heterogeneity of outcomes in the
field. After performing an advanced search in Google Scholar and filtering
out studies that do not match a list of selection criteria, I include 16 studies
from which 46 observations are drawn at the treatment level. At this point,
I code a set of moderator variables representing experimental protocols and
calculate Cohen (1988)’s d effect size as dependent variable of a weighted
least squares (WLS) regression where larger studies are given more weight.
Among the results, which are robust to different techniques for computing
standard errors, I find that emotions induce higher risk aversion when a
multiple price list a` la Holt and Laury (2002) is used in place of stated
preferences methods, as well as in case the risk elicitation task is framed
as an investment decision instead of an abstract choice. Given the variety
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of procedures employed in this type of experiments and in the absence of a
tailor-made game to answer such research questions, I recommend faithful
study replication as preferential path in order to investigate the influence of
emotions on risky decision making and ensure comparability.
The third chapter offers evidence on the impact of communication on
the provision of public goods whose quality is uncertain. I run a laboratory
experiment with two treatments, where the control variable is pre-play com-
munication in the form of unrestricted text chat. A binary threshold public
goods game with four-person groups and threshold of three is at the core of
the design, the main novelty lying in the provision mechanism with ambiguity.
Moreover, a private signal for the actual value of the public good is provided,
before the contribution decision. In accordance with related literature, I find
that communication significantly increases public good provision by reducing
inefficiency that comes from wasteful undercontribution. Nevertheless, the
players in the chat treatment seem to neglect the free-rider issue and often
end up overcontributing, in contrast with previous scientific findings. After
chat analysis, I propose the pursuit of symmetric payoffs within the group
as original explanation of the massive overcontribution, in addition to group
identity generated by the partner matching and the common fate hypothesis.
Since the players prefer to minimize ambiguity than to maximize the group
earnings, I finally speculate that under uncertainty satisficing is more salient
than optimizing.
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Prefacio
En esta tesis doctoral se aplica la metodolog´ıa experimental en el contexto
de dos l´ıneas de investigacio´n en Economı´a. La primera l´ınea investiga el
papel de las emociones casuales en la toma de decisiones en situaciones ar-
riesgadas. La segunda l´ınea de investigacio´n trata de aportar luz al impacto
de la comuniacio´n sobre la cooperaciio´n. La tesis consta de tres cap´ıtulos.
En el primer cap´ıtulo se realiza un experimento de laboratorio con el fin
de estudiar el efecto de las emociones de tristeza y felicidad, sentidas como
casuales no relacionadas con la decisio´n propiamente dicha, sobre la toma de
decisiones bajo riesgo. El proceso de induccio´n de una emocio´n es la variable
tratamiento de un disen˜o entre-sujetos en el que hay dos sesiones cuyos objet-
ivos son, respectivamente, elicitar tristeza y felicidad. Dos grupos adicionales
se caracterizan por condiciones neutrales y sirven de tratamiento base. Tras
cierta manipulacio´n que permite verificar la validez del proceso de induccio´n,
se utiliza una lista mu´ltiple de precios a` la Holt and Laury (2002) para eli-
citar las preferencias individuales frente al riesgo en el contexto de una tarea
de eleccio´n de loter´ıas. El ana´lisis revela que los dos tipos de emociones,
tanto tristeza como felicidad, suponen mayor aversio´n al riesgo en relacio´n
a condiciones neutrales, un resultado que puede moderarse por la tarea de
elicitacio´n de actitud frente al riesgo. Por lo tanto, como explicacio´n persua-
siva se propone la teor´ıa del agotamiento del ego, que establece que regular
las emociones a fin de procesar informacio´n consume un recurso limitado, el
autocontrol, tambie´n necesario para tomar decisiones ma´s arriesgadas.
El segundo cap´ıtulo es un metana´lisis de estudios experimentales sobre
el tema analizado en el primer cap´ıtulo, con el objetivo de explicar la het-
erogenidad tradicional de los resultados en la literatura sobre el tema. Tras
realizar una profunda bu´squeda en Google Scholar y tras dejar fuera estudios
que no casan con una lista de criterios de seleccio´n, se incluyen 16 estudios
de los que se extraen 46 observaciones a nivel de tratamiento. Tras ello, se
codifican un conjunto de variables moderadoras que representan protocolos
experimentales y se calculan los efectos taman˜o d de Cohen (1988) como
variable dependiente de un modelo de regresio´n por mı´nimos cuadrados pon-
derados (WLS) en el que se ha dado mayor peso a estudios con ma´s obser-
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vaciones. Un resultado que es robusto ante diferentes me´todos de ca´lculo del
error esta´ndar es que las emociones inducen mayor nivel de aversio´n al riesgo
cuando la elicitacio´n se realiza a partir de una lista mu´ltiple de precios a` la
Holt and Laury (2002) en vez de con me´todos de preferencias declaradas.
Tambie´n ocurre cuando la tarea de elicitacio´n de la actitud frente al riesgo
se etiqueta como una decisio´n de inversio´n en vez de una eleccio´n abstracta.
Dada la variedad de procedimientos utilizados en este tipo de experimentos
y en la ausencia de un juego hecho a medida para contestar a las cuestiones
planteadas, se recomienda, en aras de la comparabilidad, la re´plica fiel como
pauta preferencial con el objetivo de investigar la influencia de las emociones
en la toma de decisiones bajo condiciones arriesgadas.
El tercer cap´ıtulo ofrece evidencia sobre el impacto de la comunicacio´n
en la provisio´n de bienes pu´blicos cuya calidad es incierta. En este trabajo
se disen˜a un experimento de laboratorio con dos tratamientos, siendo la vari-
able de control la comunicacio´n previs a la toma de decisiones a trave´s de un
chat online de texto libre. El nu´cleo del disen˜o es un juego de bienes pu´blicos
con decisio´n binaria, grupos de cuatro jugadores y umbral de tres. La prin-
cipal novedad del disen˜o esta´ en el mecanismo de provisio´n con ambigu¨edad.
Adema´s, la provisio´n del bien pu´blico depende de una sen˜al privada que se
env´ıa antes de que se tome la decisio´n de contribuir. Acorde con la liter-
atura relacionada con el tema, se encuentra que la comunicacio´n incrementa
de forma significativa la provisio´n del bien pu´blico reduciendo la ineficiencia
que proviene de una contribucio´n derrochadora e ineficiente. En contraste
con investigaciones anteriores, sin embargo, los sujetos en el tratamiento
con chat parecen ignorar el asunto del polizo´n y, muy a menudo, acaban
sobre-contribuyendo. Tras un ana´lisis exhaustivo del chat, se propone la
bu´squeda de pagos sime´tricos dentro del grupo como explicacio´n a una ma-
siva sobre-contribucio´n, adema´s de una identificaio´n con el grupo generada
por el emparejamiento fijo y la hipo´tesis del destino comu´n. Dado que los
jugadores prefieren minimizar la ambigu¨edad a maximizar las ganancias del
grupo, se especula en definitiva que, en condiciones de incertidumbre, se
prioriza satisfacer a optimizar.
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Chapter 1
Incidental emotions and
risk-taking: An experimental
analysis
1.1 Introduction
At the present time, choice behavior is commonly regarded as the product
of two interacting processes, say, the former more deliberative and logical,
whereas the latter more impulsive and driven by emotions (Loewenstein et al.,
2015). Despite this, scholars in the social sciences have been firstly interested
in the development of the rational part of the story, this occurring notably
in the field of risky decision making, if one considers the long-standing ex-
pected utility theory (EUT). The trend has been inverted only in the second
half of the past century, when the outcomes of early behavioral experiments
revealed the failure of mainstream theories and renewed intellectual curiosity
about the affective sphere. Since then, researchers have lavished increasing
endeavors to discover what sort of influence emotions exert on risk attitude,
by virtue of far-reaching implications which range from organizational con-
texts (Andrade and Ariely, 2009) to individual investment decisions (Cohn
et al., 2015).
The present chapter intends to make an empirical contribution to a recent
literature whose outcomes are still inconclusive and inconsistent with each
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other. In order to investigate the effect of incidental sadness and happiness
on risky choices, I conduct a laboratory experiment with an emotion induc-
tion procedure as treatment variable and a between-subjects design. As to
its structure, two treatments aim at inducing either sadness or happiness,
respectively, whereas two further groups are characterized by neutral condi-
tions and serve as baseline. After a manipulation check verifies the validity of
the induction procedure, I use a multiple price list (MPL) a` la Holt and Laury
(2002) to elicit individual risk preferences in the context of a lottery-choice
task.
The analysis reveals that both sadness and happiness promote greater
risk aversion than neutral conditions, a result which is in line with Drichoutis
and Nayga Jr (2013) but not supported by the Affect Infusion Model and
the Mood Maintenance Hypothesis, the two benchmark theories in the area
of interest. The circumstance that the above-mentioned authors in turn
employed a MPL highlights the concern about the risk elicitation method
as potential moderator for the emotional influence on risky decision making,
this being worth further investigation.
To conclude, as effective explanation I suggest that the experimental sub-
jects, in an attempt to regulate sadness (or happiness) and carry out the
risk elicitation task, end up being ego-depleted. Indeed, there is evidence
that people under ego depletion become more pessimistic and, consequently,
might regard their own chances as less favorable (Fischer et al., 2007), thereby
avoiding risky choices.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. After Section 1.2 re-
views the related literature, the experimental design is outlined in Section 1.3.
The results are introduced in Section 3.4, which includes the manipulation
check as well as the overall analysis, before I discuss consistent explanations.
Section 3.5 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
The academic interest in the role of emotions in risky decision making dates
from the last decades of the past century, with the topic catching mainly
the attention of psychologists. As fruits of these early efforts, two contra-
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dictory theories still prevail in the literature, that is, the Affect Infusion
Model (AIM) (Forgas, 1995) and the Mood Maintenance Hypothesis (MMH)
(Isen and Patrick, 1983). On the one hand, the former suggests that positive
(negative) affect leads to perceive a given situation as more (less) favorable,
thereby fostering relatively risk-seeking (prudent) behavior. On the other
hand, the latter posits that, when feeling good (bad), people are protective
of (impatient to change) their own positive (negative) affective states and
consequently take less (more) risks.
After the pioneering article by Elster (1998) spotlights the debate in
Economics as well, traditional observational studies using proxies for emo-
tions (Kliger and Levy, 2003; Kamstra et al., 2003) gradually make way
for papers based on experiments, which definitely ensure greater reliability
when it comes to identifying the causality nexus between affect and ensu-
ing risky choices. At this point, results from early experiments point out
that anxiety has different impact on risk attitude in comparison with sad-
ness (Raghunathan and Pham, 1999), as well as fear does not produce the
same effect as anger (Lerner and Keltner, 2001). This implies that valence,
which refers to the degree that an emotion is positive or negative, repres-
ents a relevant factor to predict risk-seeking behavior but cannot be the only
one, as Zeelenberg et al. (2008) notice. Therefore, the same authors invite
researchers to focus on specific emotions when it comes to addressing similar
research questions.
At the same time, the increasing use of procedures artificially inducing
affective states in the context of experiments involves greater production of
papers dealing with emotions, rather than moods. Indeed, in both Economics
and Psychology the consensus is that emotions are short feelings triggered
by a specific stimulus, whereas moods persist longer but their origin is un-
defined, with the term affect acting as umbrella concept and encompassing
both the previous definitions (Robbins and Judge, 2012; Lerner et al., 2015).
Moreover, given that the emotions elicited during such experiments are of-
ten unrelated to the following choice to be made, incidental emotions are
more frequently investigated than integral emotions, the case where, on the
contrary, affect is linked to the outcome of the decision at hand (Rick and
Loewenstein, 2008).
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To date, the AIM and the MMH have continued to serve as benchmarks
for ongoing research, even though these psychological theories still rely on
a valence-based approach. Manuscripts uniformly endorse either the AIM
(Grable and Roszkowski, 2008; Stanton et al., 2014) or the MMH (Kliger
and Levy, 2003; Kim and Kanfer, 2009), irrespective of the methodology
used by the authors. Other studies come to intermediate conclusions, in the
sense that do not fully support either theory (Drichoutis and Nayga Jr, 2013;
Conte et al., 2018).
As Treffers et al. (2016) propose, the mixed evidence might be due to the
fact that according to the experimental protocols in the field of Psychology
subjects do not need to be remunerated, differently from the practices in
Economics. Since risk tolerance is a socially desirable quality, participants
may want to appear risk-lover when stakes are hypothetical and misreporting
risk attitude is costless (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). Likewise, given the
common mild evidence for treatment effects, publication bias could also play
a role in case the magnitude of effect sizes is so small that it prevents papers
from being published.
In particular, the inconsistencies might be ascribed to the heterogeneity
of risk elicitation methods, considering the variety of procedures adopted in
the literature. Indeed, this array ranges from simple self-reported measures
of risk propensity (Yuen and Lee, 2003; Chou et al., 2007), usually obtained
through non-incentivized questionnaires, to more sophisticated tasks estim-
ating risk parameters of models with assumptions on the utility function
(Drichoutis and Nayga Jr, 2013; Fehr-Duda et al., 2011). In an attempt to
guide the reader to an informed choice, Charness et al. (2013) illustrate ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the most commonly used methods, reaching
the conclusion that the decision depends on the research question and the
characteristics of the sample population. This insight is shared by Crosetto
and Filippin (2016), who in a theoretical and experimental assessment of four
risk elicitation methods explain the between-tasks inconsistencies partly by
construction and in part because of behavioral artifacts. Among the latter,
for instance, I could mention the context of risky decision making, since it
is well-established that familiarity with the domain of choices reduces risk
perception (Hanoch et al., 2006).
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Acknowledging that solving the issue of study-to-study variability in pre-
vious findings goes beyond the scope of this chapter, now I aim to make an
empirical contribution to the discussion and outline the experimental design.
1.3 Experimental design
The experiment is programmed by means of the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007) and held at the Laboratory of the Faculty of Economics of Universita`
Politecnica delle Marche (Ancona, Italy), involving 123 students (59 females)
recruited from the university campus thanks to the system ORSEE (Greiner,
2015).
As summarized in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, the subjects are randomly as-
signed to four treatments (here coinciding with sessions) that differ from one
another in the control variable, namely, the emotion induction procedure. In
more detail, the design consists of two treatments which aim at eliciting either
sadness or happiness, respectively, in addition to two treatments serving as
baseline and obtaining neutral conditions with two different methodologies.
Table 1.1: Treatments
S-treatment H-treatment Baseline
Subjects 35 30 30 28
Targeted emotion Sadness Happiness Neutrality Neutrality
Induction proced. Sad stim. Happy stim. Neutral stim. -
Except for the induction procedure, each session follows the same scheme
in such a way that any difference in risk attitude captured by the risk eli-
citation task can be ascribed to the targeted emotion, which is triggered by
the treatment variable. In the end, one of the subject’s choices in the task
is randomly selected and paid out for real, this payment method being equi-
valent to remunerating all the decisions (Cubitt et al., 1998; Hey and Lee,
12
Table 1.2: Structure of each session
Order Phase
1 Socio-demographic questionnaire
2 Induction procedure (treatment variable)
3 Manipulation check
4 Risk elicitation task
5 Payment feedback
2005). Each session lasts approximately 40 minutes and the mean earnings
amount to 8 euro, including a show-up fee of 3 euro.
At first, I let the participants take their seats in the cubicles so that the
instructions are immediately explained aloud, with a focus on the monetary
incentives provided. Hence, the subjects are supposed to fill in a socio-
demographic questionnaire which, in addition to a number of filler items,
controls for individual characteristics potentially interacting with risky de-
cision making (gender, age, and willingness to take risks).1
At this point, I invite the participants to put on the headphones, thereby
conveying an audiovisual stimulus which is treatment-specific. Indeed, draw-
ing inspiration from a battery of techniques validated by Westermann et al.
(1996), a combination of music and pictures is used in order to elicit the
targeted emotions with greater efficacy than either method taken separately
(Mayer et al., 1995):
• in the S-treatment (sad treatment) I broadcast a couple of minutes from
the musical piece “Polymorphia”by Krzysztof Penderecki along with a
slideshow of images from concentration camps;
• in the H-treatment (happy treatment) the selected track is Leonard
Bernstein’s “Mambo”, whose video is shown in the passionate perform-
1The rationale behind the placement of the questionnaire at the outset lies in the
question about willingness to take risks, which represents a dispositional measure of risk-
seeking behavior and, in order to be meaningful, needs to be asked before the induction
procedure.
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Table 1.3: The multiple price list in the version by Holt and Laury (2002)
No. Option A Option B
1 1/10 of 2.00, 9/10 of 1.60 1/10 of 3.85, 9/10 of 0.10
2 2/10 of 2.00, 8/10 of 1.60 2/10 of 3.85, 8/10 of 0.10
3 3/10 of 2.00, 7/10 of 1.60 3/10 of 3.85, 7/10 of 0.10
4 4/10 of 2.00, 6/10 of 1.60 4/10 of 3.85, 6/10 of 0.10
5 5/10 of 2.00, 5/10 of 1.60 5/10 of 3.85, 5/10 of 0.10
6 6/10 of 2.00, 4/10 of 1.60 6/10 of 3.85, 4/10 of 0.10
7 7/10 of 2.00, 3/10 of 1.60 7/10 of 3.85, 3/10 of 0.10
8 8/10 of 2.00, 2/10 of 1.60 8/10 of 3.85, 2/10 of 0.10
9 9/10 of 2.00, 1/10 of 1.60 9/10 of 3.85, 1/10 of 0.10
10 10/10 of 2.00, 0/10 of 1.60 10/10 of 3.85, 0/10 of 0.10
ance by Gustavo Dudamel and the Simo´n Bol´ıvar Youth Orchestra;
• in the related two sessions, the baseline seeks to induce neutral condi-
tions respectively by means of (i) a combination of pictures of animals
and an excerpt from the first movement of the very well-known “Sym-
phony No. 40”by Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, piece already validated
by Va¨stfja¨ll (2002); (ii) the absence of any induction procedure.
In accordance with the protocols in the field, at this stage the induce-
ment of the targeted emotions is proved through a manipulation check which
consists in asking participants to report their own affective state, this being
presented in the results section.
Afterwards, the subjects carry out a risk elicitation task in the form of
multiple price list (MPL), a format adopted for the first time by Binswanger
(1980) and popularized by Holt and Laury (2002) in the version reported in
Table 1.3.2
2Apart from that one illustrated in the text, the design includes two successive multiple
price lists which are not part of the research of this work, and accordingly will not be
further considered.
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In a nutshell, the original task is based on a ten-row list where the subjects
are supposed to make ten decisions in succession between paired lotteries,
with one choice being played out for real as salient incentive. In each row,
Option A is less variable and thus considered safer than Option B, given that
the outcome probabilities are the same. Moreover, since the probabilities
to win the highest amounts increase with the choice number, at the same
time Option B becomes more and more inviting so that by the last row
of the table even the most risk-averse person is expected to switch from
the safer Option A to Option B. Speculating that people behave in line
with expected utility theory (EUT), each choice corresponds to an interval
of the parameter measuring risk aversion under the assumption of a specific
functional form, that is, the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility
function. Therefore, the switch point captures the individual degree of risk
aversion. Otherwise, as the authors notice, greater generality can be obtained
by considering the amount of safe choices, which in Table 1.3 corresponds to
the number of Options A.
In an attempt to correct some drawbacks of the task according to the
suggestions in Abdellaoui et al. (2011), my design modifies the version by
Holt and Laury (2002) as follows.
Instead of comparing lotteries, the subjects are supposed to choose between
lotteries and sure payoffs, this leading to superior tractability. As to the lot-
teries, one of the two outcomes is set to 0 for the sake of clarity (Shupp et al.,
2013). Finally, I aim at increasing generality and replace the probability scale
with an outcome scale, so as to take into consideration also non-expected
utility behaviors where people evaluate probabilities non-linearly.
The resulting MPL is contained in Table 1.4, where an individual switch-
ing from B to A between choices 6 and 7 exhibits risk neutrality. If one
switches earlier (later), instead, she reveals herself to be risk-averse (risk-
lover).
As said, in the end one of the ten choices is randomly selected and played
out, so that the earnings are converted into euro for the final payment.
Given the inconsistencies in previous findings related to sadness and hap-
piness, I have no prior beliefs about the direction of the effects on risk atti-
tude.
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Table 1.4: The multiple price list in my experimental design
No. Option A Option B Exp. payoff difference
1 100 1/2 of 300, 1/2 of 0 - 50
2 110 1/2 of 300, 1/2 of 0 -40
3 120 1/2 of 300, 1/2 of 0 -30
4 130 1/2 of 300, 1/2 of 0 -20
5 140 1/2 of 300, 1/2 of 0 -10
6 150 1/2 of 300, 1/2 of 0 0
7 160 1/2 of 300, 1/2 of 0 10
8 170 1/2 of 300, 1/2 of 0 20
9 180 1/2 of 300, 1/2 of 0 30
10 190 1/2 of 300, 1/2 of 0 40
1.4 Results
Now I present the results of the experiment within a three-parted section.
The structure of the manipulation check is introduced at the beginning, be-
fore I perform an overall analysis and finally discuss consistent explanations
in a devoted subsection.
1.4.1 Manipulation check
Before moving to the analysis, I need to go through a couple of preparatory
steps. The manipulation check allows me to verify that the targeted emotions
were correctly induced, this implying that (i) the two alternative methodo-
logies to induce neutrality actually led to the same outcome, and (ii) both
sadness and happiness were properly elicited in the respective treatments.
Hence, between the emotion induction procedure and the risk elicitation
task I asked subjects to report a self-evaluation of the current affective state
by using 6-point Likert scales for a number of filler adjectives, in addition to
those ones of interest (Matell and Jacoby, 1971).
Table 1.5 shows that the adjectives were treatment-specific, thereby con-
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Table 1.5: Emotion-related questions after the induction procedure
S-treatment H-treatment Baseline
How much are Sad Happy Sad Sad
you ..... from 0 Worried Carefree Happy Happy
to 5? Scared Serene - -
Doubtful Determined - -
tributing to the emotion inducement. At the same time, potential demand
effects are not a concern, given that the direction of the emotional impact on
risk attitude is not intuitive. Furthermore, since the subjects were free to re-
spond “0”and signal indifference, the procedure permitted to collect reliable
answers (Campos-Vazquez and Cuilty, 2014), as well as to make pairwise
comparisons with the baseline.
For the sake of interpretation, the 6-point Likert scale is dichotomized
so that each individual is classified as under the influence of emotion just in
case her self-evaluation ranges from 3 to 5 with respect to the corresponding
adjective. Accordingly, a score between 0 and 2 entails absence of the affect
in question.
Table 1.6: Emotions in the two baseline sessions
With stimulus Without stimulus
Sad 2 6
Non-sad 28 22
Total 30 28
Happy 22 20
Non-happy 8 8
Total 30 28
Absolute frequencies.
As displayed in Table 1.6, by so doing the 7% of subjects (2 out of 30) in
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the baseline session with neutral stimulus are categorized as sad, with this
percentage not differing from the 21% (6 out of 28) in the group without in-
duction procedure according to a two-tailed Fisher’s exact test (p = 0.138).
Likewise, the distribution of happy participants in the two sessions is stat-
istically similar (73% vs 71%), as the same test confirms (p = 1.000). This
implies that the neutral induction procedure is validated and allows me to
handle the two baseline groups as a whole in the remainder of the analysis.
Table 1.7: Comparing treatments and baseline
S-treatment H-Treatment Baseline
Sad 16 - 8
Non-sad 19 - 50
Total 35 - 58
Happy - 27 42
Non-happy - 3 16
Total - 30 58
Absolute frequencies.
Moreover, Table 1.7 reports that on the one hand, the subjects in the S-
treatment are classified as sad in 46% of cases (16 out of 35), which according
to a one-tailed Fisher’s exact test test is actually higher than the 14% (8 out of
58) in the baseline, with significance at the 1% level. On the other hand, the
proportion of happy participants in the H-treatment is significantly greater
than in the neutral sessions (90% vs 72%), this resulting from the same test
(p < 0.05).
Therefore, I conclude that the targeted emotions were correctly induced,
and in the next subsection I am able to attribute possible differences in risk
attitude to the dissimilar affect experienced at the time of decision making.
1.4.2 Overall analysis
Before presenting the results, in particular I highlight the coding of two
variables:
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• willingness to take risks (WTTR), the answer to the following question
contained in the initial questionnaire: “You are offered the opportunity
to acquire a security which, with the same probability, allows you either
to gain 1000 euro or to lose the invested sum. How much are you willing
to pay for such a security?”(Guiso and Paiella, 2008).
• number of risky choices, the individual amount of risky decisions in my
version of the multiple price list (Table 1.4), where each Option A is
considered safe and each Option B is classified as risky. This number
ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values corresponding to greater risk
tolerance.
Table 1.8: Summary statistics by treatment
S-treatment H-Treatment Baseline
No. of risky choices 4.66 5.13 5.79
Female 0.43 0.43 0.53
Age 22 22 23
WTTR 80 80 100
No. of subjects 35 30 58
Means for number of risky choices; relative frequencies for gender; medians for
age and willingness to take risks (WTTR).
The related summary statistics are reported in Table 1.8 in addition to
some demographics. According to a battery of Kruskal-Wallis tests, the three
groups are not drawn from the same population with respect to the median,
when I look at individual characteristics (p-values equal to 0.519, 0.299,
and 0.528 for female, age and willingness to take risks, respectively). This
confirms that the subjects have been randomly allocated across treatments.
Instead, the test finds significant differences as to the amount of risky choices
(p < 0.01), this preliminary result encouraging towards further analyses.
Hence, by considering the number of risky choices as outcome variable
of an ordered logit model, I follow the original approach by Holt and Laury
(2002) and avoid dropping the 49 subjects out of 123 (40%) who switched
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Table 1.9: Explaining risky choices
Dependent variable: No. of risky choices
(1) (2)
Sadness -1.257*** -1.279***
(0.409) (0.398)
Happiness -0.773* -0.772*
(0.415) (0.399)
Female -0.050
(0.324)
Age -0.064
(0.078)
WTTR 0.001
(0.001)
LR χ2 13.01 11.13
Prob > χ2 0.023 0.004
Pseudo R-squared 0.027 0.023
No. of subjects 123 123
Coefficient estimates from the ordered logit model, with standard
errors in parentheses. Sadness and happiness are the treatment
dummies.
***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
*Significant at the 10% level.
back and forth in the MPL.3
As shown in Table 1.9, the coefficients of the treatment dummies sadness
and happiness are negative and statistically significant, this meaning that
both emotions fostered risk aversion with reference to the baseline. Regarding
this outcome, which can be appreciated in Figure 1.1, I observe a strong effect
of sadness (p < 0.01) but only mild evidence as to happiness (p = 0.06). A
3All the data, tables and figures reported in this chapter use the full sample of ob-
servations. Nevertheless, concerning the decision to include such inconsistent subjects in
the analysis, there is no agreement in the literature. For instance, Crosetto and Filippin
(2016) regard this choice as not methodologically sound. In order to tackle this concern, I
repeat the analysis by restricting the attention to those subjects who never switched from
Option A to Option B, but the medians by treatment are unchanged. An Epps-Singleton
test fails to reject the hypothesis of no differences in the distribution of the number of
risky choices between the restricted sample and the full one, this holding true for all three
treatments.
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reasonable explanation lies in the fact that the inducement of happiness was
slightly less effective than the sadness elicitation (p < 0.05 vs p < 0.01),
thus leading to smaller effect size when it comes to the number of risky
choices. Accordingly, the limited effect magnitude associated with happiness
would require greater sample size in order to be detected, as power analysis
confirms.4
Figure 1.1: Proportion of risky choices in each decision
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Pro
po
rtio
n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decision
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H-treatment Risk-neutral prediction
Finally, the findings are not driven by any of the individual characteristics,
so that in column (2) I maintain only the treatment dummies. This second
specification emphasizes that the effects are genuine.
4When I compare the H-treatment with the baseline, power is equal just to 0.36, a
value which appears to be distant from the benchmark of 0.80 (Moffatt, 2015). On the
contrary, the comparison between S-treatment and baseline reaches the satisfactory level
of 0.78.
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1.4.3 Discussion
Searching for explanations consistent with the results, the long-standing the-
ories of the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) (Forgas, 1995) and the Mood Main-
tenance Hypothesis (MMH) (Isen and Patrick, 1983) do not fully account for
the fact that both the S-treatment and the H-treatment promoted risk aver-
sion with respect to neutral conditions.
On the one hand, the conjectures of the AIM are in line with (i) the
relatively cautious choices made under sadness, yet fail to explain (ii) such
a behavior under happiness. On the other hand, the MMH supports (ii) but
is not consistent with (i).
Nevertheless, my findings are not actually unprecedented, given that
Drichoutis and Nayga Jr (2013) come to the same conclusions by employing
a multiple price list (MPL) a` la Holt and Laury (2002) as well. The circum-
stance renews the idea of the risk elicitation method as possible moderator for
the influence of emotions on risky decision making, this being worth further
investigation.
As effective explanation, the results of the chapter are coherent with
the argument that the psychological phenomenon known as ego depletion
(Baumeister et al., 1998) played a role during risky decision making. Accord-
ing to this theory, suppressing emotions, processing information and making
active choices are only some of a number of mental activities consuming a
limited self-regulatory resource, which can be seen as a kind of energy. Once
this resource is even partly used, subsequent performance on self-control tasks
will be impaired.
Regarding the consequences of ego depletion on risky decision making,
Unger and Stahlberg (2011) have recently organized the area by distinguish-
ing two types of risk behavior. If the decision task takes the shape of a
gamble without perceived control over the final outcomes, such as playing
the lottery or roulette, then ego-depletion conditions are expected to in-
crease risk-taking. Whereas, greater risk aversion is predicted when it comes
to a decision scenario where people are more responsible. For instance, as
the authors themselves suggest, this is the case of “economic decisions or the
selection of various options that differ from each other with regard to out-
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come probabilities and pay-offs”, so long as both the negative and positive
consequences of the decision materialize immediately. Otherwise, reduced
self-control fosters risk-seeking behavior, such as in the successive choice to
smoke, whose emotional rewards are instantaneous but negative effects arise
only in the distant future.
Basically, the conclusions from this psychological strand are compatible
with the scenario whereby my experimental subjects, in an attempt to reg-
ulate sadness (or happiness) and carry out the risk elicitation task, ended
up being ego-depleted. Given that the MPL a` la Holt and Laury (2002) en-
tailed reasoning about outcome probabilities and pay-offs, the resulting risk
aversion is in line with previous literature.
Such a behavior under ego depletion is further justified by strategic think-
ing, if one takes her own reduced self-control into account and thus considers
risk-taking as an emotional threat. Finally, there is also evidence that people
in this condition exhibit “a less-optimistic sense of their own abilities, a lower
sense of subjective control, and less-optimistic expectations about their fu-
ture”(Fischer et al., 2007).
1.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I conducted a laboratory experiment in order to investigate
the effect of incidental emotions on risky decision making. On the one hand,
the work found a source of motivation in the large number of fields which
could benefit from the results, from organizational contexts to individual
investment decisions. On the other hand, I aimed to make an empirical
contribution to a recent literature whose outcomes are still inconclusive and
inconsistent with each other.
The analysis revealed that both sadness and happiness promoted greater
risk aversion with respect to neutral conditions, a result which is in line
with Drichoutis and Nayga Jr (2013) but not supported by the AIM and the
MMH, the two benchmark theories in the area of interest. The circumstance
that the above-mentioned authors in turn used a multiple price list a` la Holt
and Laury (2002) reaffirmed the concern about the risk elicitation method
as potential moderator for the emotional impact on risky decision making,
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this being worth further investigation.
As effective explanation, I suggested that the experimental subjects, in an
attempt to regulate sadness (or happiness) and carry out the risk elicitation
task, ended up being ego-depleted. Indeed, there is evidence that people
under ego depletion become more pessimistic and, consequently, might regard
their own chances as less favorable (Fischer et al., 2007), thereby avoiding
risky choices.
To conclude, given the enduring inconsistencies in findings, I recognize
the issue of study-to study variability as major challenge for future academic
efforts.
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Appendix 1A. Experimental instructions
[The following instructions are translated from Italian. They were displayed on monitors
and were the same across treatments, except for screens 4a, 4b, and 5.]
SCREENS 1 and 2. You are going to take part in a game aiming to study individual
behavior. During the game you will be asked to fill in a questionnaire and then to make
decisions. Throughout the session, the amounts displayed are expressed in the form of
experimental currency units (ECU), your final profit being converted into euro in the end.
Moreover, you will be able only to observe your own choices, without information about
the other participants’ decisions. Anyway, you are not expected to interact with the others
and, accordingly, your final earnings will be affected just by your own choices. We finally
want to remind you that during the experiment it is forbidden to speak with the other
participants as well as to use mobile phones. In case you need further clarification, please
raise your hand and a member of the staff will come to your assistance.
SCREENS 3 and 4. [Here participants could fill in the socio-demographic question-
naire containing the three variables used in the analysis in addition to four filler questions
(FQ)] Please answer the following questions:
1. How old are you?
2. What is your gender?
3. What is your father’s profession? (FQ)
4. What is your mother’s profession? (FQ)
5. What is your mother’s level of education? (FQ)
6. You are offered the opportunity to acquire a security which, with the same probab-
ility, allows you either to gain 1000 euro or to lose the invested sum. How much are
you willing to pay for such a security? [Here participants could select any integer
between 0 and 1000 euro]
7. In general, how much do you think you are healthy? Use the following 0-10 rating
scale. (FQ)
SCREENS 4a and 4b. [These screens were present only in S-treatment, H-
treatment, and baseline with neutral stimulus. Here participants were verbally invited to
put on the headphones so that we could convey a treatment-specific stimulus according to
the guidelines in Section 1.3]
SCREEN 5. Describe your current affective state by using a 0-5 rating scale for
the following adjectives, where “1”corresponds to “Not at all”and “6”to “Very much”.
[The adjectives displayed in the S-treatment were “sad”, “worried”, “scared”, and “doubt-
ful”. The adjectives displayed in the H-treatment were “happy”, “carefree”, “serene”,
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and “determined”. The adjectives displayed in the two baseline treatments were “sad”and
“happy”.]
SCREENS 6 and 7. In this game you are supposed to make ten decisions in
succession between a sure amount and a lottery which allows you to win either 300 ECU
or nothing with the same probability. Your actual payoff will be determined through the
random draw of one of the ten decisions. In case a decision where you chose the lottery
is selected, then the lottery is played out for real too. Such a payoff will be added to an
initial endowment of 100 ECU.
SCREEN 8. [Here participants could make the ten binary decisions by carrying
out the MPL in the version illustrated in Table 1.4, whose last column was not shown.]
SCREENS 9-17. [Here participants carried out other two MPL which are not part
of the research agenda of this work, and accordingly are not considered.]
SCREEN 18. [Here we showed the individual final profit to participants.]
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Chapter 2
20 years of emotions and risky
choices in the lab. A
meta-analysis
2.1 Introduction
Starting from early criticism of the paradigm of homo oeconomicus, under-
standing the role of emotions in the broad area of decision making has been
one of the greatest academic goals, say, a multidisciplinary challenge which
many researchers have been willing to take on especially in the last two dec-
ades, if one considers that yearly scholarly papers on the topic amounted to
over 400 in 2013, but “doubled from 2004 to 2007 and again from 2007 to
2011”(Lerner et al., 2015).
Despite in its infancy, the field is already so vast that a number of different
approaches can be chosen in order to join the debate. Fortunately, two recent
articles facilitate the task and provide a complementary view of the literature
(George and Dane, 2016; Lane, 2017), thereby also highlighting the strands
where the results are particularly unclear.
The former manuscript goes through the papers appeared in Organiz-
ational Behavior and Human Decision Processes since the 1990s and dis-
tinguishes topical areas according to whether the emotions arise from the
decision to be made in the future (integral emotions) or, instead, from an un-
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related stimulus (incidental emotions). However, both these lines of research
investigate the influence of affects on subsequent choices, with a further sec-
tion being devoted to affective states as consequences of decision-making.
The latter review, in addition, analyzes interactive behavior separately
from individual behavior, yet concentrates its efforts on happiness only. In
this composite framework, as Lane (2017) himself notices, research on the
impact of happiness on risky choices is definitely a field rife with unanswered
questions and contradictory results, but “the literature may be reaching the
stage where a meta-analysis would be a useful endeavour”. Therefore, the
present work accepts this invitation and aims to explain traditional het-
erogeneity of outcomes in the area of interest by means of meta-analytic
evidence.
After performing an advanced search in Google Scholar and filtering out
studies that do not match a list of selection criteria, I include 16 manuscripts
from which 46 observations are drawn at the treatment level. At this point,
I code a set of moderator variables representing experimental protocols and
calculate Cohen (1988)’s d effect size as dependent variable of a weighted
least squares (WLS) regression where larger studies are given more weight.
In the analysis I find that emotions induce higher risk aversion when a
multiple price list a` la Holt and Laury (2002) is used in place of stated pref-
erences methods, as well as in case the risk elicitation task is framed as an
investment decision instead of an abstract choice. These results are robust
to different techniques for computing standard errors and in line with related
literature not inspecting affects. The regressions also show that the role of
geographic differences is unclear, and stakes do not systematically influence
behavior yet salient payments increase variability of outcomes, thereby con-
tradicting solid evidence (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). Overall, anxiety
turns out to be the only emotion leading to effects of the same sign, in the
direction of greater risk aversion. At the same time, the data confirm that
the valence-based approach should not be followed, since emotions of the
same valence trigger significantly different risky choices.
To conclude, given the variety of procedures employed in this type of
experiments and in the absence of a tailor-made game to answer such research
questions, I recommend faithful study replication as preferential path in order
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to investigate the influence of emotions on risky decision making and ensure
comparability.
The remainder of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the
literature related to the meta-regression. Section 2.3 offers an extensive view
of data and methodology before the analysis is carried out in Section 2.4,
where I present the results as well. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
Notably in use in the medical sciences, meta-analysis is a quantitative lit-
erature review which combines and evaluates empirical results through the
methodological rigor of statistical techniques. In a nutshell, meta-regression
analyses share the same limitations as narrative literature reviews but hold
a relative advantage, namely, the criteria by which the studies are included
and any misuse can be discussed on objective technical grounds (Stanley,
2001). Generally, for each selected paper a summary statistic is computed
in the form of standardized mean difference or regression coefficient, this
index capturing the effect magnitude and acting as dependent variable. In-
stead, the regressors represent characteristics of the original design which
are deemed to be responsible for the study-to-study variation of the research
findings. Hence, it is not surprising that this statistical tool rapidly prolif-
erated in the branch of Experimental Economics (Zelmer, 2003; Oosterbeek
et al., 2004; Engel, 2011; Johnson and Mislin, 2011; Capraro et al., 2018),
where the features of designs can be easily coded.
In line with this tendency, the current chapter focuses on the experimental
literature for a couple of reasons. As Lane (2017) suggests, laboratory exper-
iments outperform other research methods on the opportunity to observe ac-
tual risk-seeking behavior rather than just self-reported attitude. Moreover,
the controlled environment typical of the lab provides clear advantage over
survey-based studies in identifying causality. Finally, the presence of an af-
fect induction procedure allows to distinguish emotions from moods, which
by nature do not arise from a triggering stimulus and hold different traits
(Robbins and Judge, 2012; Lerner et al., 2015).
The strand of literature on how risk preferences are shaped by incidental
29
emotions is characterized by two opposing psychological theories, that is,
the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) (Forgas, 1995) and the Mood Maintenance
Hypothesis (MMH) (Isen and Patrick, 1983). The former predicts positive
emotions to induce risky, and negative emotions safe choices, while the latter
gives the inverse prediction. As previously mentioned, the topic has produced
a number of papers with unclear results which do not fully support either
theory, to such an extent that a meta-regression might be a worthwhile effort.
The following studies, included in the analysis according to the selection
criteria enumerated in Section 2.3, offer an accurate representation of such
heterogeneity of outcomes.1
Raghunathan and Pham (1999) find that sad subjects make relatively
risky choices but individuals under anxiety prefer to stay cautious, in com-
parison with the neutral control group. The results show that negative affects
can trigger different behaviors, thereby stating the failure of the valence-
based approach.2 This conclusion is endorsed by Fessler et al. (2004), who
also raise the question of gender effect by demonstrating that anger increases
risk-taking in men and unpleasantness reduces risk-taking in women.
An asymmetric influence of emotions is detected by Yuen and Lee (2003),
in the sense that sadness leads to conservative decisions but no differences
emerge between happiness and the neutral control. Chou et al. (2007) rep-
licate the study by adding individual age as further treatment variable of
the design. In this way, the authors find similar effect of sadness as to young
participants, in addition to risk-seeking behavior under happiness when older
subjects are compared. Basically, the AIM is fully supported only with refer-
ence to aged participants. A different story is told by Stanton et al. (2014),
according to which the effect is asymmetric the other way round, with happy
individuals being relatively risk-seeking and no differences between sad sub-
jects and neutral ones.
The study by Zhao (2006) provides evidence in favor of the MMH, whereas
Webb et al. (2012) conclude that individuals are willing to take more risks
under unpleasantness, which still can be strategically controlled by deciding
1The complete list of included papers is provided in Appendix 2A.
2Valence is the positive vs negative value of affect, nevertheless represents just one of
the emotional factors influencing risky decision making (Lerner et al., 2015).
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in advance how to act, that is, through implementation intentions.
Yip and Coˆte´ (2013) discover that incidental anxiety is able to reduce risk-
taking, but the influence is counteracted in case one succeeds in identifying
the source of her own emotion. Mixed evidence for the two main theories
is offered by Drichoutis and Nayga Jr (2013) and Colasante et al. (2017),
whose experiments elicit risk preferences through multiple price list formats
and demonstrate that both positive and negative emotions lead to an increase
in risk aversion.
Conte et al. (2018) also provide mixed endorsement, but in their case
both positive and negative affects reduce cautiousness. Same findings are
reported by Hu et al. (2015), who still fully endorse the AIM in case the
experimental subjects make decisions under time pressure.
Campos-Vazquez and Cuilty (2014) investigate decision making under
anger, sadness and fear, and conclude that sadness causes risk aversion but
the other two affective states have no impact. Regarding sadness, similar
yet weaker evidence is found by Treffers et al. (2016), whose results are also
robust to variation of monetary incentives.
Finally, within a recent body of research aiming to give an emotion-based
explanation for financial choices, Guiso et al. (2018) come to the conclusion
that individuals under fear are willing to take less risks than the neutral
control group. The study by Lee and Andrade (2015) confirms this result
related to the financial context, as well as shows that the effect can be re-
versed by manipulating the framing of the decision task in such a way that
fear is reinterpreted as excitement.
Such variety of findings is accompanied by further mixture of methods
adopted, which makes it hard to explain the inconsistencies without resorting
to quantitative techniques. Possible causes are discussed in the following
section along with the coding of variables.
2.3 Data and methodology
In this section I offer an extensive view of the methodology adopted to cal-
culate comparable effect sizes and select pertinent studies, before presenting
the set of moderator variables for the meta-regression.
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2.3.1 Effect size and identification of studies
The prototypical study that I aim to include in the analysis is based on
a lab experiment consisting of treatments which differ only in the emotion
artificially induced, although further control variables are free to change in
the presence of factorial designs. After a manipulation check analyzes self-
reported emotions and confirms the validity of the procedure in comparison
with a neutral control, the subjects are supposed to carry out a task capturing
risk-seeking behavior. At this point, any discrepancy in risk preferences
between treatments can be ascribed to the different emotion experienced
at the time of decision making and represents the effect size, that is, the
summary statistic acting as dependent variable in the meta-regression. Since
papers generally measure risk-seeking behavior through different scales and
units of measurement, effect size usually takes the form of a standardized
mean difference (SMD) which, following Cohen (1988)’s approach, is also
known as Cohen’s d :
SMD = d =
Y E − Y C
σpooled
(2.1)
where Y E is the average outcome of the experimental group, Y C is the average
outcome of the control group, and σpooled is the pooled standard deviation
worked out like this:
σpooled =
√
(nE − 1)σ2E + (nC − 1)σ2C
nE + nC − 2 (2.2)
with the sample sizes (n) also instrumental in obtaining an approximation
of the standard error of the SMD (SESMD):
SESMD =
Ã
(nE + nC)
nE ∗ nC +
SMD2
2 ∗ (nE + nC) (2.3)
However, researchers sometimes investigate the impact of emotions in the
context of regressions, generally by adding a treatment dummy among the
explanatory variables for each emotional group. In this case, as effect size
I consider the related regression coefficient divided by the pooled standard
deviation, which on this occasion utilizes the standard deviation of the treat-
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ment dummy and the residual standard deviation in the computation. The
procedure is endorsed by Chinn (2000), who also validates an approximate
method to convert an odds ratio (OR) into SMD whenever the outcome
variable is not continuous:
SMD =
√
3
pi
ln(OR) (2.4)
where the SMD is roughly equivalent to dividing ln(OR) by 1.81.3 Therefore,
each effect size is a comparison of an experimental group under a certain
emotion with a control group in a neutral condition, all the other variables
being fixed.4 In case its value is positive (negative), then the subjects under
the considered emotion made relatively risky (cautious) choices in relation to
the neutral control group. An effect size close to zero denotes little influence
of the corresponding emotion on risky decision making.5
Anyway, the identification of studies pertinent to the meta-analysis turns
out to be rather cumbersome, since the sort of experiment being subject
matter of the research does not own an universal denomination to be trans-
lated into keywords for a formal search, differently from other games in
Experimental Economics. Moreover, the choice of appropriate keywords is
hampered by a couple of motivations. First and foremost, a few manuscripts
adopt a definition to conceptualize and another to operationalize, for instance
by speaking about moods but at the same time employing stimuli to induce
affective states, a procedure which according to the literature generates emo-
tions (Robbins and Judge, 2012). Hence, I decide to consider the operational
3In the same way, SESMD =
SEln(OR)
1.81
.
4For instance, Conte et al. (2018) run four treatments inducing different emotions
(happiness, sadness, fear, anger) in addition to a neutral control treatment, this study
thereby producing four observations in the meta-regression. Furthermore, scholars some-
times provide more than one estimate of the same effect by using different measures and
techniques. Not to give excessive weight to a single study, in these cases I “choose the
estimate that the author believes to be the best”(Stanley, 2001). When not possible, I
pick the measure which is chronologically closer to the induction procedure, since it is a
well-known fact that emotions are fleeting (Robbins and Judge, 2012). Finally, whenever
an experiment is based on a factorial design or a paper is made up of more than one
experiment, then I duplicate the number of observations accordingly. For further details,
I refer the reader to Appendix 2B.
5Of note, in case a study analyzes risk-aversion instead of risk-seeking behavior, then
I multiply its effect size by -1.
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definition. Then, it is not infrequent that different terms are employed in
order to refer to presumably the same emotion, both between and within
articles.
Therefore, in an attempt to be inclusive I use Advanced Search in Google
Scholar by looking for papers, even not published, which in the title contain
either the word risk or risky, as well as one of the following terms: emotion,
emotions, mood, moods.6 Furthermore, the word experiment needs to be
present within the text, in order to easily filter out different methodologies.
The resulting code is the following:
intitle:”risk OR risky” intitle:”emotions OR emotion OR moods OR mood” intext:experiment
with this search being conducted in July 2018 and yielding a list of 236 items.
At this point, for the sake of comparability the following criteria are
applied:
1. the manuscript has to be grounded in a lab experiment, requirement
which guarantees the identification of the causal nexus;
2. the experiment is between-subjects with respect to emotion, since the
mixture with within-subjects studies is questionable from a statistical
viewpoint (Morris and DeShon, 2002);
3. the experimental design needs to include an affect induction procedure,
whose effectiveness is checked at least in a pre-test.7 In this way I can
be sure that only specific emotions and not vague moods are analyzed,
these emotions actually being present;
6Unfortunately, the asterisk wildcard character is not available in the Advanced Search
environment.
7Among the studies included only Campos-Vazquez and Cuilty (2014) avoid testing the
efficacy of the emotion induction procedure, simply because in their design the treatment
variable is the intensity of the procedure and the subjects self-select into the emotion
experienced.
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4. a neutral control treatment is used and sufficient information needs to
be available in the text so that the effect size can be computed through
comparison.
This enables me to select 12 manuscripts, and other 4 are added after
checking the references of the papers thus found.8 Finally, from the 16 studies
which match the requirements I draw 46 observations at the treatment level,
these articles being concentrated in the last two decades.
2.3.2 Moderator variables
Now I aim to choose a set of variables which represent experimental protocols
and, according to related literature not investigating affects, may explain the
inconsistencies in previous research findings.
Emotions
First of all, for each observation I need to control for the emotion induced in
the treatment group, since different emotions might have dissimilar impact
on risk-taking and, accordingly, on effect sizes. As mentioned in the previous
subsection, this task is hindered by the fact that different terms are employed
in order to refer to presumably the same emotion, both between and within
articles. Therefore, having exploited information in the original texts, I seek
to trace affects back to a common denominator in such a way as to solve the
issue.
By so doing, in Table 2.1 for each umbrella emotion I am able to create a
dummy variable equal to 1 in case the effect size originates from a comparison
8An example of a study not fulfilling the first criterion is Kliger and Levy (2003),
where exogenous variations in weather are used as proxy for affective states. To give
other examples, the design by Kuhnen and Knutson (2011) does not satisfy the second
requirement, given that each subject experiences more than one emotion. Isen and Patrick
(1983) does not comply with the third requisite, since no manipulation check is present
in order to validate the emotion induction procedure. Instead, the fourth criterion is
not satisfied in Heilman et al. (2010) due to the absence of a control treatment, which
makes it impossible to calculate effect sizes. Anyway, a substantial number of papers are
not considered because they investigate risk perception, which according to Weber and
Milliman (1997) constitutes a different measure of risk attitude.
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between that emotion and the neutral condition, and 0 otherwise.9
Table 2.1: Generating dummy variables for emotions
Umbrella emotion Original terms
Happiness Happiness; Joviality; Joy; Pleasure; Positivity
Sadness Sadness; Grief
Unpleasantness Unpleasantness; Disgust; Displeasure; Negativity
Anxiety Anxiety
Fear Fear; Fearfulness
Anger Anger
Risk elicitation methods
At this point, because lots of different risk elicitation methods are used in
the selected papers, I try to highlight homogeneous categories in an attempt
to explain variation in effect sizes. Accordingly, a relevant distinction is
that one between stated preferences and revealed preferences. Regarding
the former, self-reported measures are definitely one of the simplest tools to
elicit risk attitude, as described in Charness et al. (2013). In this case, each
participant directly evaluates her own willingness to take risks in general or
within specific domains, a non-incentivized procedure which still produces
values correlated with the results of real-stakes lottery-based tasks (Dohmen
et al., 2011). In addition, the absence of a task as filter makes it easier for
an individual to appear risk-lover, which according to Camerer and Hogarth
(1999) is a socially desirable attribute.
Instead, concerning revealed preferences there exists a vast array of more
complex risk elicitation methods which would be arduous to consider as a
whole. In line with the characteristics of the dataset, in this heterogeneous
9Especially in the case of “positivity”and “negativity”, which are maybe the most del-
icate terms to locate, I base my choice on similarities in the emotion induction procedure.
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group I isolate the multiple price lists (MPL) a` la Holt and Laury (2002),
namely, a number of similar tasks where the switch point from a safer to a
riskier option captures risk behavior in a multiple-choice environment. In
their theoretical and experimental appraisal of four risk elicitation methods,
Crosetto and Filippin (2016) point out that the MPL holds some features
which do not favor risk-taking. Indeed, the final payment stems from a
compound lottery instead of a simple one, a situation promoting risk aversion
although the two cases should be equivalent under the Reduction Axiom
(Kaivanto and Kroll, 2014). Moreover, the presence of a safe option in the
list may induce certainty effects or act as a reference point.
Hence, in order to check if risk elicitation methods moderate the effect of
emotions on risk attitude, I include a dummy Stated preferences equal to 1 if
a self-reported measure of risk-taking is used, and 0 otherwise. The variable
MPL is coded as 1 if risk preferences are elicited through a multiple price list,
and 0 otherwise. Finally, a third dummy Other task takes on a value of 1 if
revealed preferences are captured via other methods, mostly consisting in a
single lottery choice. Given the related literature, I expect MPL to predict
lower effect sizes than Stated preferences, the reference group.
Domain
Whether risk preferences are observed through self-reported measures (Hanoch
et al., 2006) or elicited by means of more sophisticated tasks (Lee and An-
drade, 2015), previous research demonstrates that context matters, in the
sense that risk attitude is domain-specific and significantly depends on the
framing of the elicitation method (Charness et al., 2013). In particular,
Hanoch et al. (2006) notice that familiarity with the domain of choices lowers
risk perception in such a way that, for instance, athletes take more recre-
ational risks than subjects engaged in other professions.
In order to tackle the problem, the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT)
Scale (Blais and Weber, 2006) represents a valid solution via questionnaire,
whereas lottery choices should be presented in an abstract fashion when it
comes to measuring revealed preferences.
Anyway, many of the included studies analyze risk attitude under a single
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domain of life (e.g., gamble, health, job security) which may moderate the
influence of emotions. Among the various contexts, investment decisions are
of particular interest to economists, therefore I single out the corresponding
domain and assign a value of 1 to the dummy Investment domain when this
framing is used. Abstract domain takes on a value of 1 if the context of the
risk elicitation method is neutral and, finally, the variable Other domain is
equal to 1 in case a different framing is employed.
Considering that (i) in a specific context (such as the financial one) a
lower number of participants may feel at ease than in a generic abstract
domain, and (ii) the experiments in the dataset mostly draw upon samples
of students, then I expect Investment domain to be associated with lower
effect sizes than Abstract domain, the omitted category.
Salient payment
Given the interdisciplinarity of papers in the meta-analysis, difference in
experimental practices between Economics and Psychology is taken into ac-
count in the form of salient financial incentives, which are traditionally used
only by economists. Indeed, there is solid evidence that monetary incentives
reduce data variability and, when a standard for optimal behavior is present,
“bring decisions closer to the predictions of the normative models”(Hertwig
and Ortmann, 2001). Nevertheless, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) come to
the conclusion that average behavior does not change to a great extent in
tasks without a performance standard, such as choosing among gambles. The
authors emphasize that only in a few circumstances related to risky decision
making subjects take more risks when the payment is hypothetical, presum-
ably due to the fact that risk-taking is a socially desirable quality. To see
if this is also the case of the current dataset, I generate a dummy Salient
payment equal to 1 in case the participants are remunerated according to
their own actions, and 0 otherwise.10
10Random payment is regarded as salient, since it is well-established that this scheme
can be equated with the pay-all approach (Cubitt et al., 1998; Hey and Lee, 2005). Instead,
fixed payment is not considered to be salient (Friedman and Sunder, 1994).
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Geographic variables
The dataset consists of 46 observations coming from experiments run in 4
continents: 18 data points from Europe, 13 from North America, 3 from Latin
America, and 12 from Asia. As to the body of literature dealing with cultural
differences in risk-taking, to date there is no agreement on the role played
by local institutions. On the one hand, Hsee and Weber (1999) formulate
the cushion hypothesis, according to which people from collectivist societies
can rely on extended social networks able to give financial support, in case of
need. This would lead to perceive the same uncertain choice as less risky and,
accordingly, to take more risks than the citizens of individualistic societies,
with this effect holding true only with respect to the investment domain. On
the other hand, Kim and Park (2010) suggest that individualistic societies
shape self-enhancing behavior and self-esteem, which are typically associated
with risk propensity. In the absence of a predominant theory, the meta-
regression might make a contribution to the debate.
2.4 Analysis and results
As said in Section 2.3, Cohen’s d effect size is worked out for the 46 obser-
vations, this index being positive (negative) in case the experienced emotion
leads to relatively risky (cautious) behavior, and close to zero when the effect
is negligible.
The inconsistencies in previous findings are highlighted in Figure 2.1,
which displays an overall effect size ranging from -3.5 to 6.7 and confirms
the validity of the meta-analytic approach. Taking into account that this
statistic does not distinguish the various emotions induced, the literature
is characterized by effect sizes which differ in sign but are substantively of
small magnitude, in line with the narrative review by Lane (2017). Indeed,
the interval [-0.5, 0.5] encompasses 41.3% of the observations. Moreover,
a one-sample sign test is not able to reject the null hypothesis that the
average effect size is equal to 0 (p = 0.30), which would comply with the
mainstream theory predicting no influence of emotions on decision making.
Egger’s regression test excludes the presence of publication and related biases
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Figure 2.1: Effect size distribution
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(p = 0.49).
At first sight, the high variation in effect sizes seems not to be explained
even when I break down the dependent variable by emotion in Table 2.2.
The insight is supported by the fact that across studies 5 of the 6 affective
states have both positive and negative impact on risk-seeking behavior, with
only Anxiety leading to outcomes of the same sign and low dispersion.
Furthermore, although in Figure 2.2 the distribution of the effect sizes
related to Anger appears to be shifted towards greater risk, a Kruskal-Wallis
test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the six emotion-based groups are
drawn from the same population with respect to the median (p = 0.36). This
preliminary result urges me to look at the other variables as possible sources
of the study-to-study variation.
Hence, I estimate the following specification by using weighted least
squares (WLS):
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Table 2.2: Analyzing effect size
Effect size
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Total 46 0.016 1.844 -3.464 6.680
Happiness 12 -0.062 1.336 -2.109 2.180
Sadness 13 -0.358 1.060 -1.327 2.453
Unpleasantness 6 -0.810 1.692 -3.464 0.907
Anxiety 4 -0.465 0.193 -0.700 -0.293
Fear 7 0.548 2.903 -2.652 6.680
Anger 4 2.256 2.944 -0.103 6.264
Stated preferences 11 -0.141 0.957 -1.281 2.009
MPL 13 -0.919 1.005 -3.464 0.203
Other task 22 0.647 2.303 -2.652 6.680
Abstract domain 32 0.148 2.089 -3.464 6.680
Investment domain 2 -1.572 1.528 -2.652 -0.491
Other domain 12 -0.072 0.943 -1.281 2.009
Salient payment 19 0.458 2.617 -3.464 6.680
Non-salient payment 27 -0.295 0.950 -2.652 2.009
Asia 12 -0.072 0.983 -1.309 2.009
North America 13 -0.276 1.275 -2.652 2.658
Latin America 3 -0.035 0.332 -0.414 0.203
Europe 18 0.294 2.658 -3.464 6.680
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√
wi + ...+ βkxik
√
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√
wi (2.5)
where yi is the effect size, xij stands for the j th methodological variable out
of k regressors, and wi represents the analytic weight for the ith observation.
Indeed, the rationale behind the use of weights lies in the fact that effect
sizes from larger studies are more precise than those from smaller studies,
and accordingly should be given more weight. Following Hedges and Olkin
(1985), each analytic weight is conceived in comparison to the sum of the 46
datapoints and computed in the ensuing fashion:
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Figure 2.2: Effect size by emotion
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
Eff
ec
t s
ize
Happiness Sadness Unpleas. Anxiety Fear Anger
wi =
1
σˆ2i
=
nEi n
C
i /(n
E
i + n
C
i )∑
[nEi n
C
i /(n
E
i + n
C
i )]
(2.6)
with nEi and n
C
i being the number of subjects in the experimental group and
in the control group for the ith observation, respectively.11
Moreover, the WLS estimator is deemed to be superior to conventional
random-effects, mixed-effects and fixed-effects counterparts (Stanley and Dou-
couliagos, 2017), as well as an elegant approach to deal with the problem of
heteroskedasticity, which is typical of cross sectional data. The choice of giv-
ing more weight to larger studies turns out to be methodologically sound, as
11Given that sometimes the selected papers indicated only the total number of parti-
cipants without making reference to nE
i
and nC
i
, I e-mailed all the authors in order to
calculate the analytic weights (and the effect sizes as well). In the few cases where I re-
ceived no answer, then I realistically assumed that the subjects were equally distributed
between experimental and control group. The related information is provided in Appendix
2B.
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depicted in Figure 2.3 which actually displays an inverse relationship between
variance of residuals and the analytic weights.
Figure 2.3: Inverse relationship between variance of residuals and weights
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At a later stage, I bear in mind that each manuscript is free to contribute
more data points to the meta-regression, so that it is advisable to take action
and allow for dependence between observations. Accordingly, I correct the
results by clustering standard errors at the level of paper.
Taking into consideration the small number of observations, a further
concern is represented by the fact that OLS normality assumption may be
violated. Indeed, the distribution of effect sizes fails the skewness-kurtosis
tests for non-normality, with p < 0.01 in both cases. Therefore, as additional
robustness check I accompany the previous models with another one where
the standard errors are worked out by means of the block bootstrap technique
(Moffatt, 2015).12
12As to the number of bootstrap samples, Moffatt (2015) reports that three benchmarks
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Table 2.3: Explaining effect size
Dependent variable: Effect size (tr)
(1) WLS (2) Clustered WLS (3) B. Bootstrapped WLS
MPL (tr) -5.881*** -5.881*** -5.881**
(1.480) (1.287) (2.434)
Other task (tr) -1.850 -1.850 -1.850
(1.375) (1.161) (1.289)
Investment domain (tr) -3.552*** -3.552*** -3.552***
(0.840) (0.828) (1.237)
Other domain (tr) -1.890 -1.890* -1.890
(1.357) (1.031) (1.256)
Salient payment (tr) 0.955* 0.955* 0.955
(0.484) (0.489) (0.827)
North America (tr) -2.601*** -2.601*** -2.601*
(0.596) (0.542) (1.483)
Latin America (tr) 0.721 0.721 0.721
(0.716) (0.594) (0.957)
Asia (tr) -2.019*** -2.019*** -2.019
(0.686) (0.587) (1.309)
Sadness (tr) 0.060 0.060 0.060
(0.472) (0.639) (0.544)
Unpleasantness (tr) -1.708** -1.708** -1.708*
(0.680) (0.654) (1.031)
Anxiety (tr) 0.209 0.209 0.209
(0.773) (0.733) (0.914)
Fear (tr) 1.683** 1.683 1.683*
(0.611) (1.068) (0.908)
Anger (tr) 1.669** 1.669 1.669*
(0.660) (0.983) (0.859)√
wi 3.805*** 3.805*** 3.805**
(1.338) (0.964) 1.783)
Prob > F 0.000 - -
R-squared 0.763 0.763 0.763
Adj R-squared 0.659 - 0.659
Observations 46 46 46
WLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses, which are clustered at the level of
paper in column (2) and worked out with block bootstrap technique in column (3). (tr) indicates
the variable transformed by the square root of the analytic weight, which consequently becomes the
constant of the models. The omitted categories are Stated preferences, Abstract domain, Non-salient
payment, Europe and Happiness.
***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
*Significant at the 10% level. 44
Table 2.3 suggests that the issues related to dependence between obser-
vations and the violation of OLS normality assumption may not be serious,
since the three models produce similar results.
After controlling for the specific type of emotion investigated, some ex-
perimental protocols appear to moderate the relationship between affect and
risk in a way that is coherent with related literature. In particular, studies
using a multiple price list a` la Holt and Laury (2002) observe significantly
lower effect sizes than manuscripts collecting self-reported measures of risk
attitude (p < 0.01). As remarked in Section 2.3, Crosetto and Filippin (2016)
already speculated that some aforementioned characteristics of this format
foster risk aversion, when comparing tasks that gauge revealed preferences.
Actually, the insight still holds true under emotions and in relation to stated
preferences methods.
Likewise, I find significant evidence that emotions induce greater risk
aversion when the risk elicitation method is framed as an investment de-
cision in place of an abstract choice (p < 0.01), this outcome supporting
the idea that reduced familiarity with the context is associated with higher
risk perception (Hanoch et al., 2006). Instead, remunerating participants in
a salient way seems not to bias effect sizes but increases their magnitude
(Levene’s test, p < 0.01), at odds with evidence in Hertwig and Ortmann
(2001).
While all these findings are robust to the different techniques for comput-
ing standard errors, the effects for the geographic regions are more mixed.
When participating in experiments conducted in North America, subjects
take less risks than in Europe (the omitted category), this being the only
geographic variable which preserves significance in all three columns. This
result is also hard to be explained through any culture-based theory, hinting
at the role of other unobserved characteristics of these regions.
Finally, Table 2.4 varies the omitted category and reports the coefficients
for the dummies controlling for the emotions, when standard errors are calcu-
lated with block bootstrap technique. In this way the reader can appreciate
that actually the six affective states lead to different outcomes with respect
appear to have emerged, that is, either 99 or 999 or 9999. I go for the last-mentioned value,
since a substantial number of replications are dropped due to perfect multicollinearity.
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Table 2.4: Different impact of emotions
Omitted category
Happiness Sadness Unpleas. Anxiety Fear Anger
Happiness - -0.060 1.708 -0.209 -1.683* -1.669*
Sadness 0.060 - 1.768 -0.149 -1.623*** -1.609***
Unpleas. -1.708* -1.768 - -1.917 -3.391** -3.377**
Anxiety 0.209 0.149 1.917 - -1.474* -1.460*
Fear 1.683* 1.623*** 3.391** 1.474* - 0.014
Anger 1.669* 1.609*** 3.377** 1.460* -0.014 -
WLS coefficient estimates with standard errors worked out with block bootstrap tech-
nique, by varying the omitted category.
***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
*Significant at the 10% level.
to each other. This remark emphasizes the failure of the valence-based ap-
proach, given that emotions of the same valence do not have similar effects on
risk attitude. Specific affects should be chosen when developing the research
question.
2.5 Conclusions
The chapter is a meta-analysis of experimental studies dealing with the im-
pact of incidental emotions on risky choices, so as to explain traditional het-
erogeneity of outcomes in the field. In the text I accepted the invitation from
Lane (2017), who had previously reviewed the area of interest by underlining
the necessity of a meta-regression to account for inconclusive findings.
After performing a weighted least squares (WLS) regression where larger
studies are given more weight, I found that emotions induce higher risk aver-
sion when a multiple price list a` la Holt and Laury (2002) is used in place
of stated preferences methods, as well as in case the risk elicitation task is
framed as an investment decision instead of an abstract choice. These results
were robust to different techniques for computing standard errors and in line
with related literature not inspecting affects. The regressions also showed
that stakes do not systematically influence behavior yet salient payments in-
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crease variability of outcomes, thereby contradicting solid evidence (Hertwig
and Ortmann, 2001). Moreover, the role of geographic differences remained
unclear and further investigation of this aspect might be a fruitful endeavor.
Overall, anxiety turned out to be the only emotion leading to effects of the
same sign, in the direction of greater risk aversion. At the same time, the
data confirmed that the valence-based approach should not be followed, since
emotions of the same valence trigger significantly different risky choices.
To conclude, regarding the limitations of the current study, I recognize
that gender, age and other demographics might play a part in shaping risk
preferences. Nevertheless, it is cumbersome to investigate this at the level
of treatment. All in all, given the array of protocols used in this kind of ex-
periments and in the absence of a tailor-made game to answer such research
questions, I recommend faithful study replication as preferential path in or-
der to analyze the impact of emotions on risky decision making and ensure
comparability.
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Appendix 2B. Data
Paper Emotion Region Sample size Effect Stated MPL Other Abs. Investm. Other Salient
treated (treatment size prefer. task domain domain domain paym.
+ control) (SMD)
Campos-Vazquez and Anger Latin Am. 336* 0.20 X X
Cuilty (2014) Sadness Latin Am. 264* -0.41 X X
Fear Latin Am. 360* 0.11 X X
Chou et al. (2007) Happiness Asia 65 -0.16 X X
Sadness Asia 66 -1.03 X X
Happiness Asia 60 2.01 X X
Sadness Asia 60 -1.28 X X
Colasante et al. Happiness Europe 88 -0.43 X X X
(2018) Sadness Europe 93 -0.69 X X X
Conte et al. (2018) Happiness Europe 97 2.18 X X X
Sadness Europe 80 2.45 X X X
Fear Europe 74 6.68 X X X
Anger Europe 67 6.26 X X X
Drichoutis and Happiness Europe 53* -2.11 X X
Nayga Jr (2013) Unpleas. Europe 56* -3.46 X X
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Appendix 2B (continued)
Paper Emotion Region Sample size Effect Stated MPL Other Abs. Investm. Other Salient
treated (treatment size prefer. task domain domain domain paym.
+ control) (SMD)
Fessler et al. (2004) Anger North Am. 40 2.66 X X X
Unpleas. North Am. 39 -0.45 X X X
Anger North Am. 40 -0.10 X X X
Unpleas. North Am. 40 -2.13 X X X
Guiso et al. (2018) Fear North Am. 207 -2.65 X X
Hu et al. (2015) Happiness Asia 24** 0.34 X X
Sadness Asia 24** 0.47 X X
Happiness Asia 24** 0.36 X X
Sadness Asia 24** -1.31 X X
Lee and Andrade Fear Asia 57 -0.49 X X X
(2015) Fear Asia 60 0.69 X X X
Raghunathan and Anxiety North Am. 55** -0.29 X X
Pham (1999) Sadness North Am. 55** 0.31 X X
Anxiety North Am. 49** -0.70 X X
Sadness North Am. 49** 0.34 X X
Stanton et al. (2014) Happiness North Am. 60* 0.59* X X X
Sadness North Am. 57* -0.29* X X X
Treffers et al. (2016) Happiness Europe 38 -1.21* X X
Fear Europe 40 0.04* X X
Sadness Europe 37 -1.33* X X
Happiness Europe 72 -1.14* X X X
Fear Europe 74 -0.54* X X X
Sadness Europe 74 -0.97* X X X
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Appendix 2B (continued)
Paper Emotion Region Sample size Effect Stated MPL Other Abs. Investm. Other Salient
treated (treatment size prefer. task domain domain domain paym.
+ control) (SMD)
Webb et al. (2012) Unpleas. Europe 44* 0.70 X X
Unpleas. Europe 34* -0.42 X X
Yip and Coˆte´ (2013) Anxiety North Am. 108* -0.32 X X
Anxiety North Am. 132* -0.55 X X
Yuen and Lee (2003) Happiness Asia 36** 0.44 X X
Sadness Asia 36** -0.91 X X
Zhao (2006) Happiness Europe 40 -1.63 X X
Unpleas. Europe 40 0.91 X X
**Subjects are assumed to be equally distributed between treatment and control group.
*Elaborated from the raw data.
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Chapter 3
Communication in a threshold
public goods game with
ambiguity: Anomalies and
regularities
3.1 Introduction
Decision makers often end up with private information as the only estim-
ate of common-value public goods whose profitability is pervaded by uncer-
tainty (Cox, 2015). For instance, investment in prevention typically produces
variable outcomes due to the unpredictable nature of natural disasters and
epidemics, in such a way that even the investors themselves cast doubt on
the efficacy of such actions. In these environments, should the members of
a community be able to aggregate information, uncertainty would definitely
be reduced.
In an attempt to consider concrete applications, let me focus on joint
research projects as a case where the quality of the final output cannot be
inferred in advance. Indeed, the decision to join with colleagues to write a
manuscript can be seen as a binary contribution to a public good which is
provided only in case a threshold number of coauthors is reached, each one
possessing skills needed for the successful completion. In support of this view,
53
also the researchers of the same university department who are not involved
in a certain project can benefit from the publication of a paper, in terms of in-
creased reputation and attractiveness of the institution. Clearly, authors and
non-authors do not obtain the same returns on this public good, which still
are ambiguous and could be better predicted by means of communication.
Repeated interactions help to minimize uncertainty by offering a glimpse of
how a possible collaboration might be: if my colleagues are not very respons-
ive to e-mails or fall short of my expectations, maybe I had better work by
myself. But in case information aggregation raises expectations to an extent
that the production of a paper with actual low impact leaves coauthors dis-
appointed, future willingness to collaborate might be impaired. Basically,
low quality of the public good could hamper successive contributions. In
support of this argument, disappointment originates from the comparison
between a current event and a better state of the world which has not mater-
ialized, taking the shape of “a psychological reaction to an outcome that does
not match up to expectations”(Bell, 1985). Moreover, undertaking a joint
project without the overall necessary skills is definitely harmful, but having
a high number of coauthors may reveal minor inefficiency as well, thereby
leading to the final output at excessive cost in terms of prolonged time before
submissions. Therefore, it would be interesting to test if the opportunity to
communicate actually yields efficient outcomes also under uncertainty about
the value of the public good, given this gap in the literature on cooperation.
This chapter intends to replicate the whole process in a controlled setting,
so as to detect possible anomalies.
In order to investigate cooperative behavior, I run a laboratory exper-
iment with 160 participants equally split into two treatments, where the
control variable is pre-play communication in the form of unrestricted text
chat. A binary threshold public goods game with four-person groups and a
threshold of three is at the core of the design, which also includes a few sec-
ondary tasks measuring variables of interest. The main novelty I introduce
is related to the provision mechanism which, in case the threshold is reached,
consists in a binary lottery producing either a stated high value or a stated
low value for the whole group with fixed unknown probability over the fifteen
periods played.
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In general, during each round of the game the players are supposed to co-
ordinate on two levels: (i) the decision about whether to reach the threshold
and, if so, (ii) the decision about how many group members should contribute.
Before the contribution decision, in each period decentralized information is
provided by means of a private signal for the actual value of the public good,
with this signal being dichotomized for the sake of interpretation. Concern-
ing the two levels, (i) is related to the players’ beliefs on the binary lottery
generating the public good and, accordingly, relies on the private signal. In-
stead, as to (ii) no hint is offered and, in the absence of communication, the
most efficient outcome can occur only by chance. On the contrary, the group
members in the chat treatment can resort to a valid coordination device in
order to reach the agreement on three contributors. In this case, the partner
matching allows the groups to implement a rotation of the only one member
not contributing.
Following Palfrey et al. (2017)’s approach, I show that my game involves
three sources of inefficiency: (a) undercontribution, in case just one or two
group members contribute and the threshold is not achieved; (b) overcontri-
bution, when all four players contribute and the public good is provided at
excessive cost; (c) the usual free-rider problem.
The results at the group level emphasize that, in accordance with re-
lated literature, communication significantly increases public good provision
by reducing inefficiency that comes from wasteful undercontribution. The
observed higher provision rate in the chat treatment is fostered by the fact
that the group members hardly ever decide to coordinate on zero contribu-
tions when they are free to communicate. Indeed, contrary to my hypothesis
based on Bell (1985)’s theory of disappointment in decision making under
uncertainty, the players are not let down when they run into low quality
of the public good, after reaching the threshold. Moreover, the subjects in
the chat treatment seem to neglect the free-rider issue and often end up
overcontributing, in contrast with previous scientific findings.
After chat analysis, I discover that the issue of overcontribution is even
more pervasive than what can be observed from the mere number of group
contributors, due to moderate presence of defectors within agreements on
all members contributing. Nevertheless, the deals on this action profile are
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often successful, arguably thanks to subjects’ willingness to pursue symmetric
payoffs as well as to pronounced group identity generated by the partner
matching and the common fate hypothesis.
To conclude, despite the presence of a valid coordination device as the
rotation of the non-contributor, the group members privilege the implementa-
tion of strategies based on the systematic disclosure of all four private signals.
Since the players prefer to minimize ambiguity than to maximize the group
earnings, I finally speculate that under uncertainty satisficing is more salient
than optimizing.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews
the related literature. Section 3.3 includes a detailed description of the ex-
perimental phases as well as the hypotheses of the present work. The results
are presented in Section 3.4, where after carrying out an overall analysis,
I test the hypotheses at the group level and propose possible explanations.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
Prominent surveys on public goods games (Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011;
Dhami, 2016) identify communication as one of the non-punitive methods in
order to sustain cooperation. Although face-to-face communication turns out
to be the most effective form, still communication via computer monitor out-
performs the no communication condition on promoting cooperation (Bochet
et al., 2006). After reviewing the experimental literature on social dilemmas,
Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007) theorize the positive influence of the communic-
ation effect also in computer-mediated environments, by stressing that the
effect is as powerful as these environments are able to reproduce the features
of face-to-face communication. Palfrey et al. (2017) add that the effect of
pre-play communication on efficiency depends on the richness of the message
space, since the efficient outcomes observed under unrestricted text chat are
not found when binary or numerical messages are allowed. From a theor-
etical viewpoint, Agastya et al. (2007) indicate that binary communication
can provide individuals with incentives to contribute, with respect to absence
of communication. As far as coordination games are concerned, the picture
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becomes more complicated: one-way communication should be preferred in
games of conflict like the battle of the sexes, whereas two-way communica-
tion is more effective when there is no dominated strategy (Cooper et al.,
1992). Therefore, non-binding pre-play communication does not always en-
tail efficiency gains, which still occur in case players decide to disclose private
information (Crawford and Sobel, 1982).
Traditionally, a number of moderators whereby communication operates
have been detected, such as the development of group identity, the change of
expectations of others’ behavior and the offering of promises (Ostrom et al.,
1994). Nevertheless, even deviations from pledges on Nash equilibria are
observed (Tavoni et al., 2011).
However, the current work can be framed in the branch of the so-called
step-level public goods (SLPG) games, where the public good value is provided
as long as a certain threshold is overcome.1 Among the most common ex-
amples, the construction of infrastructures, the passing of a law in parliament
or fundraising projects are just some cases in which the quality or quantity of
the public good do not increase significantly if the contributions exceed the
threshold (Offerman et al., 1996). As Alberti and Cartwright (2016) point
out, a relevant difference from standard public goods is that there is not the
typical conflict between the maximum individual payoff and the best social
outcome, since some Nash equilibria coincide with the most efficient combin-
ation of strategies. This implies that, in addition to cooperation, the current
problem becomes a matter of coordination. In the last decade, SLPG games
have been repeatedly employed within the context of environmental issues,
notably climate change, where each individual is supposed to make an effort
so as not to surpass thresholds of environmental resources whose excessive
use could lead to harmful consequences (Tavoni et al., 2011; Barrett and
Dannenberg, 2012; Gu¨th et al., 2015). In this frame, elements of ambiguity
are often introduced to simulate uncertainty with respect to the level of the
threshold, which usually is unknown.
Ambiguity, also known as uncertainty, refers to the case where the out-
come probabilities of a risky choice are not known by the decision makers.
1Indeed, these public goods are also called threshold public goods, or public goods with
a provision point mechanism (PPM).
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On the one hand, uncertainty has been studied long in the field of indi-
vidual decision making after Ellsberg (1961)’s criticism of Savage’s expected
utility theory with subjective probabilities, mainly by postulating individual
ambiguity aversion. On the other hand, the interest in delving into ambigu-
ity within strategic environments, where ambiguity is usually elaborated as
uncertainty about the behavior of the others, has arisen only recently. Fol-
lowing this approach, evidence that ambiguity is able to blunt the free-riding
problem has proliferated in the last decades (Eichberger and Kelsey, 2002;
Bailey et al., 2005; Keenan et al., 2006). Moreover, safe strategies appear
more attractive under uncertainty, which is consistent with the ambiguity
aversion hypothesis (Kelsey and Le Roux, 2017; Calford, 2017).
Anyway, my study departs from the experimental literature as to a set of
aspects. The main novelty is related to the way ambiguity is introduced in
the experimental design: if the threshold is reached, the provision mechanism
consists in a binary lottery producing either a stated high value or a stated
low value for the whole group with fixed unknown probability over periods.
Otherwise, the contributions are lost and the lottery is not played. Moreover,
each player is provided with a private signal for the actual value of the public
good so that coordination might be hampered, given the heterogeneity of such
signals (Gu¨th et al., 2015) and the free-riders’ incentive to lie and overstate
the public good value (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). Another seminal feature
is that each group member is allowed to contribute either a fixed amount
or nothing, in compliance with the tradition of binary SLPG games where
a threshold number of contributors are needed for the production of the
public good (Dawes et al., 1986; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1991; Offerman et al.,
1998). As Offerman et al. (1996) emphasize, in this instance a crucial role
is played by the individual belief about what the other group members do,
since everyone would like her own contribution to be critical for the threshold
achievement. At the same time, the authors notice that the contribution
decision might be driven by social orientation, namely, the weight that one
ascribes to her own welfare with respect to the others’ well-being. These
factors may interact with the determinants of cooperation which are object of
study: therefore, I am going to elicit and control for them through incentive-
compatible mechanisms, as described in Section 3.3.
58
All the aforementioned characteristics are fixed throughout the experi-
ment, whose control variable is the presence of pre-play communication in
the form of unrestricted text chat.
3.3 Experimental design and hypotheses
The current section includes a detailed description of the experimental phases
as well as the hypotheses I am going to test.
A threshold public goods game is at the core of the design, which also
encompasses a Ring-test capturing social orientation and a few questionnaires
measuring variables of interest.
Table 3.1: Structure of the experiment
Treatment N◦ of sessions Subjects Females
No communication (NC) 2 80 50%
Chat 2 80 41%
As illustrated in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, I run two treatments consti-
tuted by two sessions each. The treatment variable is contained in the public
goods game and is represented by unbinding pre-play communication in the
form of unrestricted text chat. Throughout the experiment salient financial
incentives are provided, since one period of the public goods game is ran-
domly chosen and a further lottery between that period and the Ring-test
outcome determines the final payment, in addition to a show-up fee of 5 euro.
The control treatment takes one hour and a half to be carried out. I increase
the show-up fee to 7 euro in the chat sessions, which last two hours. The
experimental currency is the ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), with the
exchange rate 5 ECU = 1 euro in both the remunerated tasks of the exper-
iment. In the end, the subjects in the baseline gain on average 18.4 euro,
whereas the mean earnings in the chat treatment amount to 20.5 euro.
The experiment is programmed by using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007) and takes place at the Laboratorio de Economı´a Experimental (LEE)
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Table 3.2: Structure of each session
Order Phase
1 Control questions
2 Threshold public goods game with(out) chat
3 Socio-demographic questionnaire
4 Ring-test
5 Interdependency and empathy questions
6 Payment feedback
of Universitat Jaume I (Castello´n, Spain). Overall, I recruite 160 students
(73 females) from the university campus through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015)
and equally split them into four sessions.
3.3.1 The threshold public goods game
In each session, after the roll call the subjects are randomly allocated to
the cubicles and individually read the instructions of the first task. Before
starting the public goods game, the participants are supposed to answer
five control questions by which I want to test their grasp of the rules and
incentives of the game. Once the solutions are explained aloud, the game
begins and four-person groups are formed with partner matching over fifteen
periods. At the beginning of every period, each group member is endowed
with 50 ECU and can either contribute the entire endowment to a public
good or decide not to contribute by bearing a smaller cost equal to 15 ECU.2
The main novelty I introduce is related to the provision mechanism which
consists in a binary lottery producing either a high value of 80 ECU or a low
value of 20 ECU for each group member.
Such a lottery is based on a box containing 100 balls, and each of them
holds the same unknown probability of being white. This probability is set
2I introduce a cost for not contributing because the decision of not joining with col-
leagues in the department to write manuscripts entails a potential harm to oneself, and
not only to the other members of the community.
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to 70% and concealed from the subjects, who only know that the probability
is constant throghout the treatment. Every period, in case the threshold of
three contributions out of four is reached, one ball is drawn: if the ball is
white, each member wins 80 ECU. Otherwise, 20 ECU. In case the threshold
is not achieved, the contributions are not refunded and the lottery is not
played.
Moreover, before making the contribution decision, every player is provided
with a private signal which, for the sake of interpretation, is dichotomized.3
Indeed, each group member draws an independent sample of 10 balls from
the box and subsequently receives a message which can be of two kinds:
• the sample proportion of white balls is high (greater than or equal to
5/10);
• the sample proportion of white balls is low (less than 5/10).
Following Palfrey et al. (2017)’s framework, given a group made up of N
individuals, the public good is yielded only if at least K members contribute.
Accordingly, the return net of endowment for player i amounts to:
−15 + g if i does not contribute and at least K others contribute
−15 if i does not contribute and fewer than K others contribute
−50 + g if i contributes and at least K - 1 others contribute
−50 if i contributes and fewer than K - 1 others contribute
where clearly N = 4, K = 3 and g ∈ {20, 80}.
Therefore, the game involves three sources of inefficiency: (a) undercon-
tribution, in case just one or two group members contribute and the threshold
is not achieved; (b) overcontribution, when all four players contribute and
the public good is provided at excessive cost; (c) the free-rider problem,
since everyone would prefer to enjoy the public good, whether high-valued
or low-valued, without contributing.
3From a programming viewpoint, in each period four independent samples are drawn
and then replicated in all the groups of the session.
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In the SLPG game I also address the issue of individual expectations,
that is, I take into account the individual belief about what the other group
members do. As in Caporael et al. (1989), a contribution can be categorized
as futile if fewer than K - 1 others contribute, critical if exactly K - 1 oth-
ers contribute or redundant if K or more others contribute. Since Offerman
et al. (1996) notice a positive correlation between the subjective probability
of being critical and the contribution choice, in my design I induce the parti-
cipants to truthfully reveal their own subjective probability of being critical
by means of an incentivized question, which is placed immediately after the
contribution stage.4 Hence, in each period the individual profit is the algeb-
raic sum of three components: the initial endowment, the net return and the
gain coming from the incentivized question.
At the end of every period, the players are given information on their own
individual profit, on the threshold achievement and on the outcome of the
lottery generating the public good value by means of a history table, which
summarizes relevant variables of all periods and stays visible in all stages
of the treatment. No feedback is provided about how many group members
contribute or about the period randomly selected for the final payment.
As said, the control variable is represented by unbinding pre-play com-
munication in the form of unrestricted text chat. Indeed, having received the
private signals, the players in the treatment sessions are allowed to send mes-
sages to the other group members for an interval of 90 seconds. Moreover, the
subjects are warned that such messages need be relevant to the experiment
and not intended to reveal their identity. Once time expires, the chat freezes
but the messages exchanged remain visible until the participants make the
contribution decision.
4In order to induce risk neutrality and obtain reliable answers, I combine the quadratic
scoring rule with a binary lottery procedure, as described in Harrison et al. (2014). By so
doing, the more accurate the prediction, the higher (lower) the chances of winning 5 extra
ECU (nothing). Being θ one’s subjective probability that exactly two out of the other
three group members contribute, the probability of winning 5 extra ECU is equal to
P (θ | C) = 100−100(1−θ/100)2 in case actually two out of the other three group members
contribute. Otherwise, that probability is equal to P (θ | NC) = 100− 100(0− θ/100)2.
I minimize the possible hedging problem by keeping the stakes for belief elicitation
“small”relative to the other choice tasks, in compliance with the literature (Blanco et al.,
2010).
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Before moving to the following task, the participants fill in a socio-
demographic questionnaire which also gathers data on self-reported risk aver-
sion.
3.3.2 The Ring-test and the final questionnaires
At this point, I remind the subjects that the next task is unrelated to the first
part of the experiment and I hand out the instructions of the Ring-test, also
known as Decomposed Game (Liebrand, 1984), by which I want to control
for social orientation. Afterwards, I explain aloud the rules and, once all
doubts are clarified, the game starts.
In this instance, each player is randomly matched with another parti-
cipant, whose identity remains unknown throughout the task. Each subject
faces 24 scenarios and in each of them she is supposed to choose between two
options, “A”and “B”. Each option assigns a positive or negative amount of
ECU to the subject herself (payoff x ) and to her partner (payoff y). In other
words, the players are asked to pick their preferred money allocation between
the two options displayed in each stage. Until the end of the session, no feed-
back is given about the partner’s choices and about the individual profit,
which is calculated by adding up the amount the subject assigns to herself
and the money she receives from the partner, in all scenarios. This algebraic
sum is added to (subtracted from) an initial endowment of 40 ECU.
The monetary values of the payoffs are chosen so that, considering a two-
dimensional space, the ordered pairs (x, y) are placed at 24 equally spaced
points on the circumference of a circle, which is centered at the origin (0, 0)
and has a radius of 15 monetary units. This entails that x2+y2 = 152, where
x + y is not constant.
In each scenario the player is supposed to choose between two adjacent
points on this circumference and, according to the weight assigned by the
subject to the own payoff and to the partner’s payoff, I build a motivational
vector indicating the individual’s type.5
As in Figure 3.1, individuals are traditionally classified as:
5For further details I refer the reader to Offerman et al. (1996); Brosig (2002); Bala-
foutas et al. (2013).
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Figure 3.1: The value orientation circle by Offerman et al. (1996)
• aggressive, with an observed vector lying between -112.5◦ and -67.5◦
(measured from the abscissa);
• competitive, between -67.5◦ and -22.5◦;
• individualistic, between -22.5◦ and 22.5◦;
• cooperative, between 22.5◦ and 67.5◦;
• altruistic,6 between 67.5◦ and 112.5◦.
Moreover, the length of the motivational vector is usually employed as
indicator of consistency, that is, it shows how often the subject picked the
own-other payoff combination which is the closest to her own motivational
vector. If the individual chooses consistently throughout the 24 scenarios,
the ensuing vector length is equal to 30. Random choices produce a vector
of zero length. In my case, I decide not to exclude observations from the
6In Section 3.4 I code the observed angle as Altruism.
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analysis, since only one subject’s vector length is below 7.5, the benchmark
used by Brosig (2002).
After completing the Ring-test, the participants are asked to fill in two
questionnaires measuring the degree of subjective interdependency perceived
during the public goods game and context-independent empathy, respect-
ively.7 I place them at this stage of the session for a couple of reasons. On
the one hand, the questionnaires are situated after the Ring-test in order
to avoid experimenter demand effect. On the other hand, they are filled in
before I give feedback about the final payment, thereby holding the attention
of the subjects.
Finally, at the end of the session each subject is informed of her own
wealth accumulated during the experiment and of the profit relevant to the
final payment, which comes from a fifty-fifty lottery between the Ring-test
outcome and the period randomly selected from the public goods game.
3.3.3 Hypotheses
In order to check if unexpected low quality of the public good has detrimental
effects on the successive decision to contribute, I develop the following hypo-
thesis at the individual level:
H1. Contributions are negatively affected by previous low quality of the
public good.
7As in Sonnemans et al. (1998), subjective interdependency is measured by means of a
seven-point scale for the five following questions: (1) how much influence do you think you
had on your own payoffs; (2) how much influence do you think you had on the earnings of
other group members; (3) how much influence do you think you had on the decisions of
others; (4) how much influence do you think the others had on your earnings; and (5) to
what degree do you agree with the statement “In this experiment I and the other group
members depend on each other for good results”. In Section 3.4 I average out the scores
from the five answers under the variable interdependency.
The second questionnaire aims at measuring empathy as dispositional trait consisting of
both affective and cognitive components. In order to do so, I rely on the Empathy Quotient
(EQ), a questionnaire containing 40 empathy items and 20 filler items. Participants can
earn 2, 1, or 0 points on each empathy item, so that one’s final score ranges from 80 to 0.
For further details, see Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004); Lawrence et al. (2004). In
Section 3.4 I code the individual score as Empathy Quotient.
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H1 is assumed to be true especially when the decision makers are allowed
to communicate and aggregate information. Indeed, given that the private
signals are correlated with the occurrence of high-valued public goods (70
%), the sharing of such signals is conducive to high expectations which in
case of poor quality would be disappointed.
In addition to H1, I also test some regularities related to efficiency of
communicating in threshold public goods games, starting from the outcomes
observed by Palfrey et al. (2017) which could be extended to my design.
Therefore, I formulate the following hypotheses at the group level:
H2. The likelihood of public good provision is greater in the chat treat-
ment than in the baseline.
H3. The average group earnings are higher in the chat treatment than
in the baseline.
H4. The incidence of just one or two group members contributing is
lower in the chat treatment than in the baseline.
H5. The incidence of all group members contributing is lower in the chat
treatment than in the baseline.
Basically, H2 embodies the traditional positive effect of allowing commu-
nication. If supported, this hypothesis should lead to H3, since the lottery
associated with the public good provision yields the high value on average
with 70% probability.
H4 and H5 reflect the fact that communication improves coordination,
that theoretically should occur either on three or on zero contributions. In-
deed, by allowing communication, the players’ beliefs about the value g of the
public good should drive the outcome to either one of the two combinations,
since the agreement on four contributions is not credible due to the free-
rider problem. Moreover, as I will discuss in the next section, agreements on
three contributions are feasible thanks to the presence of a valid coordination
device, that is, the rotation of the non-contributor. Thus, I assume that the
cases of undercontribution and overcontribution, which are great sources of
inefficiency, are reduced in the chat treatment.
66
3.4 Results
In this section I introduce the results of the experiment by splitting them
into three blocks.
First of all, I carry out an overall analysis that checks the performance of
H1 and produces preliminary insights into H2. Then I test the hypotheses at
the group level. The final subsection analyzes the chat messages and proposes
possible explanations.
3.4.1 Overall analysis
Before looking at the overall results, I define the following variables:
• contribution, a dummy equal to 1 if player i decides to contribute, and
0 otherwise.
• high signal, a dummy equal to 1 if player i receives a private signal
stating that the sample proportion of white balls is high, and 0 other-
wise.
• critical, the subjective probability of being critical for the threshold
achievement as revealed by player i.
Figure 3.2 shows how these variables change over time by comparing the
no communication (NC) condition and the chat treatment.
As reported in Table 3.3, the participants in the chat sessions decided to
contribute in 85.92% of cases, which according to a Chi-squared test is signi-
ficantly different from 60.42% displayed by players who were not allowed to
interact (p < 0.01). This discrepancy is clear-cut over periods and cannot be
explained by a hypothetical difference in randomness of high signals between
treatments. Indeed, high signals were generated with similar elevated fre-
quencies in the two treatments, as the same nonparametric test confirms.
Moreover, the subjective probability of being critical is significantly lower
in the baseline8 (p < 0.01) and seems to be positively correlated with the
contribution choice, as already observed in Offerman et al. (1996). Indeed,
8In this case, a one-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum test is used.
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Figure 3.2: Contributions, high signals and subjective pivotality by treatment
and period
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both the two variables tend to decrease over time, with this process being es-
pecially pronounced in CHAT critical. This is arguably due to the fact that,
as I will show in subsection 3.4.3, the group members often clinched deals
on four contributors, thus feeling less critical for the threshold achievement
even in case of contribution.
An additional insight of Figure 3.2 is that the subjects relied heavily
on the private signals in order to make the contribution decision. This is
particularly the case of chat treatment, where the negative peaks at period
13 are emblematic: few high signals entail a limited number of contributions.
Such a preliminary remark is confirmed by the random effects probit
regressions in Table 3.4, where I tackle potential dependence across players
by clustering standard errors at the group level. Indeed, column (1) shows
that the coefficient of high signal is positive and significant at the 1% level. In
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Table 3.3: Frequencies over periods
No communication Chat
Periods 1-5
Contribution 69.50 89.75***
High signal 95 92.50
Critical 67.38 74.59***
Observations 400 400
Periods 6-10
Contribution 58.50 89***
High signal 95 92.50
Critical 58.33 65.30***
Observations 400 400
Periods 11-15
Contribution 53.25 79***
High signal 92.50 92.50
Critical 54.66 54.95
Observations 400 400
All periods
Contribution 60.42 85.92***
High signal 94.17 92.50
Critical 60.12 64.94***
Observations 1,200 1,200
***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
*Significant at the 10% level.
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other words, the subjects closely followed the suggestions given by their own
signals. But in particular, the positive and significant coefficient (p < 0.01)
of the treatment dummy chat highlights the crucial role played by pre-play
communication. This effect is genuine, because in the regression I control
for information aggregation by including a variable for the number of signals
one had access to. This result at the individual level already hints at the
validity of H2. At the same time, the contribution decision is also driven
by subjective pivotality and the measure of altruism obtained through the
Ring-test (p < 0.01 in both cases).
At this point, I test H1 by checking the role of the group ability to reach
the threshold in the previous period but, quite surprisingly, the coefficients
of high-valued PG and low-valued PG are not statistically significant. This
implies that the successful provision of the public good, whether its qual-
ity is good or poor, has no consequences for the contribution choice in the
successive period, thereby leading to rejection of H1:
Result 1. Contributions are not negatively affected by previous low qual-
ity of the public good (reject H1).
Conjecturing that the low value of the public good might be more sali-
ent in the chat treatment where information aggregation raises expectations
about quality, in column (2) I add the interaction terms but still no effects
are found. Column (3) just leaves out the lagged variables and the other pre-
dictors which are not significant, thus recovering observations. The results
remain unchanged.
All in all, given that the regressor altruism has an impact on the contri-
bution decision, I conclude this preliminary overview by wondering whether
the discrepancy in the proportion of contributions can be ascribed to greater
presence of cooperative and altruistic players in the chat treatment. There-
fore, in Table 3.5 I examine participants’ social orientation as revealed by
the Ring-test, but a Fisher’s exact test is not able to reject the hypothesis of
no differences in the distribution in categories (p = 0.443).
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Table 3.4: Explaining contributions
Dependent variable: contribution decision
(1) (2) (3)
Chat 0.843*** 1.077*** 0.905***
(0.315) (0.405) (0.323)
High-valued PG 0.030 0.058
(t - 1) (0.125) (0.159)
Low-valued PG -0.097 -0.013
(t - 1) (0.121) (0.150)
High-valued PG * Chat -0.232
(t - 1) (0.230)
Low-valued PG * Chat -0.369
(t - 1) (0.245)
Trend -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.034***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Signals accessed 0.213** 0.216** 0.209**
(0.088) (0.088) (0.089)
High signal 1.107*** 1.082*** 1.166***
(0.180) (0.180) (0.173)
Critical 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Female -0.419** -0.417** -0.376*
(0.202) (0.202) (0.197)
Risk aversion 0.024 0.023
(0.063) (0.063)
Altruism 0.009** 0.009** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Empathy Quotient -0.001 -0.000
(0.011) (0.011)
Interdependency 0.190 0.190
(0.133) (0.133)
Constant -2.798*** -2.806*** -1.976***
(0.800) (0.790) (0.345)
Log pseudolikelihood -851.388 -850.467 -891.310
Wald χ2 288.750 289.510 316.280
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 2,240 2,240 2,400
Coefficient estimates from random effects probit models, with stand-
ard errors in parentheses clustered at the group level. Chat is the
treatment dummy. Trend is a linear time trend that starts from 0.
High-valued PG (t - 1) is a dummy equal to 1 if subject’s group
reached the threshold and obtained a high-valued public good in
the previous period. Low-valued PG (t - 1) is a dummy equal to 1
if subject’s group reached the threshold and obtained a low-valued
public good in the previous period. The omitted category is the case
in which subject’s group did not reach the threshold in the previous
period.
***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
*Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.5: Social orientation
No communication Chat
Aggressive 0 1
Competitive 3 6
Individualistic 41 44
Cooperative 35 29
Altruistic 1 0
Observations 80 80
Absolute frequencies.
3.4.2 Group outcomes
Now I move on to the group level analysis and test the hypotheses related to
efficiency.
Considering each group as independent observation, in Table 3.6 I com-
pare the frequency of public good provision and the average group earnings
in the two treatments by means of a one-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum test.
As the considerable discrepancy in contributions at the individual level
already suggested, the overall provision rate is significantly greater (p <
0.01) when the subjects are free to exchange messages. The outcome is not
different if I take into account any subset of periods. Indeed, in the chat
treatment the decline of public good provision is really subtle and the groups
reached the threshold on average in 92% of cases, with respect to 56% in the
baseline. On the contrary, I notice a pronounced decrease of provision rate
in the absence of communication.
Therefore, I can conclude the following:
Result 2. The likelihood of public good provision is significantly greater
with communication than without communication (support for H2).
Given this result, it is not surprising to find out that also the average
group earnings are significantly higher at the 1% level in the chat treatment.9
9The average group earnings in Table 3.6 include two of the three profit components
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Indeed, every time that the public good is provided, the associated lottery
produces the high value on average with 70% probability. In each period, the
groups in the communication sessions gained on average 253.58 ECU versus
179.15 ECU of the groups that were not allowed to chat. The mean difference
between the two treatments is not that evident at the beginning of the game
but goes beyond 110 ECU in the final periods, because of the provision rate
downfall in the no communication sessions.
Hence, H3 is supported as well:
Result 3. The average group earnings are significantly higher in the chat
sessions than in the no communication sessions (support for H3).
So far so good: the communication effect has given evidence of being
beneficial at the group level, in accordance with the literature.
At this point, I wonder if pre-play communication succeeded in lower-
ing the sources of inefficiency that I detected in subsection 3.3.1. The an-
swer is contained in Table 3.7, which displays the frequency distributions of
the number of contributors in the two treatments. Taking all periods into
consideration, the incidence of just one or two group members contributing
(wasteful undercontribution) is significantly lower at the 1% level, when com-
munication is allowed. Indeed, this occurred only in 5% of cases with respect
to 34% in the baseline, with the significant difference being consistent over
periods. Therefore, H4 is supported.
The striking result is that, when the opportunity to make unbinding
deals was given, the subjects massively preferred to coordinate on all group
members contributing, and these agreements were often successful despite
the free-rider problem. Indeed, not only H5 is not supported, but also its
opposite is true. The incidence of all group members contributing (wasteful
overcontribution) turns out to be significantly higher at the 1% level in the
chat treatment (59%) than in the baseline (18%), with this outcome being
visible in any subset of periods and at odds with the findings in Palfrey et al.
(2017). As the reader will see in the next subsection thanks to chat analysis,
of the game, that is, the initial endowment and the net return (the gain coming from the
incentivized question here is not considered).
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Table 3.6: Frequency of public good provision and average group earnings
No communication Chat
Periods 1-5
Provision rate 0.68 0.96***
High value 0.39 0.58
Low value 0.29 0.38
Group earnings 190.70 230.35**
Observations 20 20
Periods 6-10
Provision rate 0.52 0.95***
High value 0.33 0.66
Low value 0.19 0.29
Group earnings 178.90 249.80***
Observations 20 20
Periods 11-15
Provision rate 0.47 0.86***
High value 0.27 0.76
Low value 0.20 0.10
Group earnings 167.85 280.60***
Observations 20 20
All periods
Provision rate 0.56 0.92***
High value 0.33 0.67
Low value 0.23 0.25
Group earnings 179.15 253.58***
Observations 20 20
***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
*Significant at the 10% level.
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the percentage of successful agreements on four contributors is surprisingly
high as well.
Thus, I draw the following conclusions:
Result 4. The incidence of just one or two group members contributing
is significantly lower in the chat treatment than in the baseline (support for
H4).
Result 5. The incidence of all group members contributing is not signi-
ficantly lower in the chat treatment than in the baseline (reject H5). On the
contrary, it is significantly higher. The four-contributor category becomes the
modal class when communication is allowed.
Finally, the incidence of groups without contributions is similar in the
two treatments, as confirmed by the Wilcoxon rank sum test. Here I want
to emphasize that in the baseline, clearly, coordination on zero contributions
can emerge only by chance, but in the chat treatment it represents an efficient
option, in case the group members anticipate a low value by means of the
signals. Therefore, the minimal percentages throughout the fifteen periods
might be a sign of high expectations about the quality of the public good.
To sum up, in my setting the opportunity to communicate significantly in-
creases public good provision by reducing inefficiency that comes from waste-
ful undercontribution. The observed higher provision rate is fostered by the
fact that the group members hardly ever decided to coordinate on zero con-
tributions when they were free to communicate. Moreover, the players in
this condition seemed to disregard the free-rider issue and often ended up
overcontributing. This inefficient choice may be more pervasive than ob-
served, in case the outcomes with three group members contributing are due
to defectors and not to stated agreements.
3.4.3 Chat analysis and further insights
At this point, I analyze the chat messages in order to reach a better under-
standing of the group outcomes.
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Table 3.7: Frequency distributions of number of contributors
Contributors No communication Chat
Periods 1-5
0 0.04 0.03
1 or 2 0.28 0.01***
3 0.45 0.27**
4 0.23 0.69***
Efficient outcomes (0 or 3) 0.49 0.30**
Observations 20 20
Periods 6-10
0 0.10 0.01
1 or 2 0.38 0.04***
3 0.36 0.31
4 0.16 0.64***
Efficient outcomes (0 or 3) 0.46 0.32*
Observations 20 20
Periods 11-15
0 0.16 0.05
1 or 2 0.37 0.09***
3 0.33 0.42
4 0.14 0.44***
Efficient outcomes (0 or 3) 0.49 0.47
Observations 20 20
All periods
0 0.10 0.03
1 or 2 0.34 0.05***
3 0.38 0.33
4 0.18 0.59***
Efficient outcomes (0 or 3) 0.48 0.36*
Observations 20 20
***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
*Significant at the 10% level.
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Since the design is characterized by partner matching, the players were
strongly encouraged to speak out and clinch long-lasting deals. I notice a
not negligible tendency to come up with a group strategy in the early rounds
and subsequently carry it on with tacit agreement. This prevents me from
interpreting individual silence as lack of a common action profile, so that
I make the realistic assumption that the 20 groups in the communication
sessions reached agreement all the time.
Table 3.8: Agreements on the action profiles
Agreed number of contributors
Periods 0 1 or 2 3 4
1-5 3 (3) 0 (0) 13 (13) 69 (84)
6-10 1 (1) 0 (0) 12 (13) 63 (86)
11-15 5 (7) 0 (0) 14 (17) 43 (76)
All periods 9 (11) 0 (0) 39 (43) 175 (246)
Number of times the group members succeeded in carrying out the agreed
action profile in the chat treatment (number of agreements in parentheses).
Table 3.8 suggests that the problem of overcontribution is greater than
what could be observed from the mere number of group contributors. In-
deed, 82% of the agreements (246 out of 300 interactions) were reached on
all group members contributing, even if actual overcontribution amounted
only to 59% of cases. Despite the non-credible nature of these agreements
and the concrete threat of free-riding, the percentage of successful deals on
four contributors is surprisingly high, and equal to 71% (175 out of 246). This
is consistent with the fact that partner matching tends to reduce the occur-
rence of free-riding (Solow and Kirkwood, 2002). At the same time, such
an outcome might be driven by the pursuit of symmetric payoffs within the
group, a condition which is generally conducive to coordination (Crawford
et al., 2008).
Anyway, I observe that the proportion of groups with three players con-
tributing (33%) is moderately overstated by the free-rider issue, considering
that only 14% of the deals (43 out of 300) were made on three contributors.
It goes without saying that the agreements on this action profile were suc-
77
cessfully carried out very often, up to 91% of cases (39 out of 43). Scarce
convergence is detected on zero contributions, whereas none on the remaining
categories.
Now I run a Wilcoxon rank sum test on the variable interdependency,
which is a proxy for group identity (Jackson and Smith, 1999) coded as in
subsection 3.3.2, and I discover that players perceived to be significantly
more interconnected with the other group members in the chat treatment
than in the baseline (z = -2.832, p < 0.01). This result can be explained
through the common fate hypothesis, according to which “when the mem-
bers of a group are exposed to the same risk, group identification is facilitated
”(Corazzini and Sugden, 2011). Moreover, greater group identity is expec-
ted to make team reasoning more salient, whose related theories claim that
when a player identifies with the group, she will detect and implement a
strategy that achieves the maximum group payoff, thereby playing her own
part within such a joint action (Bacharach, 1999; Sugden, 2000, 2003). In
my experimental design, the partner matching allows to maximize the group
earnings in every period by means of a rotation of the only one member not
contributing that would solve the problem of free-riding as well. Therefore,
in case the players foresee high quality of the public good and accordingly
agree on reaching the threshold, theories of team reasoning would predict the
implementation of such a rotation.
Table 3.9: The actual strategies implemented
Strategy
Signal-based 128 (154)
Rotation-based 27 (28)
Others 68 (118)
Total 223 (300)
Number of times the group members succeeded in
carrying out the agreed strategy in the chat treat-
ment (number of strategies in parentheses).
Actually, Table 3.9 shows that just 9% of the actual strategies (28 out
of 300) were grounded in the rotation of the non-contributor, with a success
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rate equal to 96% (27 out of 28). On the one hand, the scarce use of this
coordination device is somewhat unexpected. On the other hand, its high
effectiveness is fully predictable because this strategy involves exclusively
agreements on three contributors.
In 51% of cases (154 out of 300) the players came up with a strategy
based on the systematic sharing of all four private signals of the group, this
action profile aiming to reduce uncertainty. Furthermore, in 97% of these
interactions (150 out of 154) all the group members honestly reported the
true values and 83% of the signal-based strategies (128 out of 154) were
successfully carried out.
The residual class contains 39% of the observations (118 out of 300) and
is mainly constituted by interactions where only some of the group members
disclosed private information. Therefore, the lower success rate (58%) may
be justified by the lack of a precise strategy.
All in all, the groups did not maximize earnings but preferred to pursue
symmetric payoffs and minimize ambiguity through the sharing of signals
period by period, a strategy which is inefficient because not compatible with
the rotation of the non-contributor.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I offered experimental evidence on the impact of communic-
ation on the provision of public goods whose value is ambiguous. I drew
inspiration from the case of joint research projects where the quality of the
final output cannot be inferred in advance. Within a context of uncertainty,
communication could lead to inefficient outcomes and, therefore, the current
chapter aimed to analyze such dynamics in a controlled environment.
The analysis at the group level emphasized that, in accordance with re-
lated literature, communication significantly increased public good provision
by reducing inefficiency that comes from wasteful undercontribution. The
observed higher provision rate in the chat treatment was fostered by the
fact that the group members hardly ever decided to coordinate on zero con-
tributions when they were free to communicate. Indeed, contrary to my
hypothesis based on Bell (1985)’s theory of disappointment in decision mak-
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ing under uncertainty, the subjects were not let down when they ran into
low quality of the public good, after reaching the threshold. Moreover, the
players in this experimental condition seemed to neglect the free-rider issue
and often ended up overcontributing, in contrast with the study by Palfrey
et al. (2017).
After chat analysis, I discovered that the issue of overcontribution was
even more pervasive than what could be observed from the mere number
of group contributors, due to moderate presence of defectors within agree-
ments on all members contributing. Nevertheless, the deals on this action
profile were often successful, arguably thanks to subjects’ willingness to pur-
sue symmetric payoffs as well as to pronounced group identity generated by
the partner matching and the common fate hypothesis. Despite the presence
of a valid coordination device as the rotation of the non-contributor, the
group members privileged agreements on four contributions and the imple-
mentation of strategies based on the systematic disclosure of all four private
signals. Since the players preferred to minimize uncertainty than to maxim-
ize the group earnings, this chapter makes an empirical contribution to the
literature on team reasoning by highlighting cases where the related theories
cannot be supported. As a result, in the presence of uncertainty satisficing
is more salient than optimizing, this insight paving the way for promising
investigations.
To conclude, regarding possible concrete applications I stress the fact that
the experiment was not framed, so that a number of compatible environments
can benefit from the results. Going back to the introductory example, the
findings of the chapter may explain the tendency to observe research pro-
jects including a large number of scholars through the willingness not to be
outperformed. Such a strategy could be undertaken in order to reduce uncer-
tainty about the final output as well. Instead, it is harder to say how serious
the inefficiency from overcontribution is, the answer arguably depending on
the various real-world situations. Definitely, further research is needed to
reinforce this view.
80
Appendix 3A. Experimental instructions
[The following instructions are translated from Spanish. They were provided on paper and
were the same in both treatments, except for the paragraph in bold related to the chat and
for the value of the show-up fee.]
TASK 1
Thank you very much for being here. All participants have the same instructions: please
read them carefully and, if you have questions or doubts, raise your hand and a member of
the staff will answer you individually. During the session, it is strictly forbidden to speak
with the other participants.
The experimental currency unit is the ECU, with an exchange rate of 5 ECU = 1 e.
The current task consists in making a number of decisions during fifteen periods. In this
experiment it is not possible to make losses, your final profit in euro depending on your
own decision made in a period randomly chosen by the PC.
In each period you will interact with other three participants in this room. The four
of you form a group that will remain the same in all periods. The identity of the other
group members will not be revealed to you throughout the session.
Every period, you have to decide whether you want to contribute to a public good.
If you decide to contribute, your amount of the contribution will be fixed and equal
to your entire endowment, that is, 50 ECU (cost of contributing). The share of public
good that you are going to win will depend on whether the other group members decide
to contribute as well. If overall less than three group members contribute, nobody within
the group will win anything and you will just lose your contribution.
Nevertheless, if overall at least three group members contribute, the share of public
good that you are going to win will depend on a random draw. There is a box containing
100 balls, where each ball has the same probability of being white (this holds throughout
the game), but no player knows this probability. A ball will be drawn from the box: if
the ball is white, the share of public good that will be assigned to you is equal to 80 ECU
and, therefore, your net return will be equal to 30 ECU. If the ball is not white, the share
of public good that will be assigned to you is equal to 20 ECU and your net return will
be equal to -30 ECU.
Before making her own contribution choice, each group member has the opportunity
to individually draw a sample of 10 balls from the box, thereby receiving a message which
can be of two kinds:
• The sample proportion of white balls is High (greater than or equal to 5/10).
• The sample proportion of white balls is Low (less than 5/10).
If you decide not to contribute, two scenarios are possible:
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• Another group member decides not to contribute, and in this case neither you nor
the other group members will win anything. You will sustain a cost of 15 ECU, but
the rest of your initial endowment will be safe.
• You are the only group member who decides not to contribute, and in this case
your share of public good will depend on the random draw, as already explained
before. The difference is that your cost, in this case, will be equal to 15 ECU.
Moreover, in each period you will be asked an incentivized question about your sub-
jective probability (from 0 to 100%) that exactly other two group members contribute to
the public good in that period. You can win either 5 extra ECU or nothing according
to the ex post accuracy of your prediction. This part of your profit will be calculated by
means of a Binary Lottery Procedure:
• Being θ your subjective probability that exactly two out of the other three group
members contribute, the probability of winning 5 extra ECU is equal to P (θ | C) =
100 − 100(1 − θ/100)2 in case actually two out of the other three group members
contribute. Otherwise, that probability is equal to P (θ | NC) = 100 − 100(0 −
θ/100)2.
For instance, if your subjective probability that exactly two out of the other three
group members contribute is equal to 80%, and this actually occurs, you win 5 extra ECU
with the following probability: P (80 | C) = 100− 100(1− 80/100)2 = 100− 4 = 96%.
[The following paragraph in bold is present only in the chat treatment.]
Before making the contribution decision, you have the opportunity to chat
with the other group members for one minute and a half, precisely. During
this interval, you are allowed exchange messages. Please take into account the
following points:
• All the messages sent by each player will reach all the group members.
• It is forbidden to write messages whose aim is to identify the other group
members.
• It is forbidden to write messages whose aim is to reveal your own identity
to the rest of the group.
• Your messages must be related to your decision-making process in this
experiment.
Once time expires, the chat will close.
In every period, your profits will be the sum of three parts:
1. Your initial endowment of 50 ECU.
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2. Your net return, that is, your share of public good minus the cost of (not) contrib-
uting, this net return ranging from -50 to 65 ECU.
3. The earnings from the incentivized question: either 5 ECU or nothing.
Remember: only one period and its corresponding profit will be relevant to the final
payment in euro.
Thank you for participating!
TASK 2
Today’s experiment also consists of another task which is unrelated to that one just carried
out. At the end of the session you will be paid via either one of the two, with the relevant
task being chosen randomly by the PC, in addition to a fixed amount of 5 euro that you
cannot lose in any case. [The value of the show-up fee was increased to 7 euro in the chat
treatment.]
In this second task your initial endowment is equal to 40 ECU and you are going to be
randomly matched with another participant of the session. Neither of the two will know
the partner’s identity.
You are given 24 scenarios and, in each of them, you are supposed to choose either
one of two options: “A”and “B”. Each option assignes either a positive or a negative
quantity of ECU to you and your partner. The amount of ECU that you are going to win
in each scenario will depend on the options chosen by you and your partner, the structure
of the 24 scenarios being the same. Throughout this task, you will not be receiving any
information about the option picked by your partner: you will just know about the overall
amount obtained at the end, after having made the 24 choices.
Below we provide you with an example of the decision-making process just described.
Suppose that you end up with a situation like the following one:
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There are four possible results:
1. If you choose option “A”and your partner picks option “B”(something that you
are not able to know), you will obtain 13 ECU (since you have chosen option “A”)
plus 3.9 ECU (since your partner has chosen option “B”), this scenario thereby
generating a total amount of 16.9 ECU for you and 22 ECU for your partner.
2. If you both choose option “A”, you will obtain 13 ECU (since you have chosen
option “A”) plus 7.5 ECU (since your partner has chosen option “A”), this scenario
thereby generating a total amount of 20.5 ECU each.
3. If you choose option “B”and your partner picks option “A”, you will obtain 14.5
ECU (since you have chosen option “B”) plus 7.5 ECU (since your partner has
chosen option “A”), this scenario thereby generating a total amount of 22 ECU for
you and 16.9 ECU for your partner.
4. If you both choose option “B”, you will obtain 14.5 ECU (since you have chosen
option “B”) plus 3.9 ECU (since your partner has chosen option “B”), this scenario
thereby generating a total amount of 18.4 ECU each.
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The PC will automatically calculate the amounts obtained in each scenario, but you
will not be given information about the results until you make all 24 decisions.
In case this task is that one randomly chosen in order to determine your profits at the
end of the session, then you will be paid the sum of your earnings in the 24 scenarios, by
means of the exchange rate 5 ECU = 1 e.
In a while the game is going to start: please click the button related to your preferred
option in order to make a choice in the current scenario.
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